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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Results of previous researches suggest that after a period of growing disconnectedness of the
Russian market, the improvement of market integration started in 1994. Nevertheless, the market
still is not near to completely integrated. This paper aims to reveal the spatial pattern of goods
market integration in Russia, and to characterize the movement of the national market as a whole to
integration. By the spatial pattern is meant a state of each individual region of the country: whether
it is integrated over the 1994-2000 span, and if not, whether it moves towards integration. The
source data for the empirical analysis are time series of the cost of a staples basket across 75 regions
of Russia with monthly frequency, the cost for Russia as a whole being used as a representative of
the national market.
It is hypothesized that the Russian goods market should eventually come to the final steady state of
complete integration, that is, to the equality of prices across all regions. Currently, the market may
be believed to be in transition towards this steady state. Hence, it is expected that three groups of
regions may exist at present: (a) integrated regions, i.e., those being in the steady state of equality of
prices; (b) non-integrated regions tending to integration, i.e., those in which prices are catching up
with each other; and (c) non-integrated regions having no such a trend. (For brevity, hereafter
regions from the second group are referred to as “regions tending to integration”, and regions from
the third group are referred to as simply “non-integrated regions.”)
Differences between prices in regions and in Russia as a whole are analyzed, thus dealing with
integration of regions with the entire national market. A region is deemed as integrated, if the price
in it fluctuates about equality with the Russian price. When regional price converges to the Russian
one (the price difference has a non-linear subsiding trend), the region is classed with ones tending to
integration. Otherwise, i.e., if the regional and Russian prices diverge or have a persistent
difference, the region is deemed as non-integrated. Of 75 Russian regions, 36% are found integrated
with the national market over 1994-2000; 44% are non-integrated regions tending to integration
with it (the speed of convergence of regional prices to the Russian level varying from 0.7% to 8.9%
per month); and 20% have no such a trend.
Analyzing the extensiveness of integration linkages between regions (with the use of Granger
causality test), it is found that, on average, price disturbances are transmitted – in either direction –
between a given region and 62% of the rest ones, thus evidencing rather high degree of regional
connectedness. Isolated groups of regions (price convergence clubs) are not detected.
Since there are both regions tending and not tending to integration, the resulting trend of the entire
national market is a priori unclear. Examining the behavior of price dispersion across regions sheds
light on the issue: the dispersion diminishes over time, implying that, despite the presence of
regions not tending to integration, the predominant trend is the improvement in market integration.
Besides that, the pattern obtained evidences that non-integration is predominantly due to persistent
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differences in prices rather than price divergence. To obtain more detailed properties of the
integration evolution, the entire cross-sectional distribution of prices is estimated for a sequence of
points in time. Its shape tends to be more regular and narrower over time, however, keeping a long
right-hand tail that is due to difficult-to-access regions. Moreover, the distribution shape
corroborates the absence of price convergence clubs.
Having obtained this sequence of distributions, the transition process between them, i.e., price
mobility of regions, is studied. The contribution of relative mobility (changes in order of regions
along the scale of relative prices) and absolute mobility (transition of regions between levels of
prices, i.e., price classes) to changes in price dispersion is traced. It is found that the decrease in the
price dispersion almost is not due to relative mobility. The main contribution belongs to absolute
mobility. The estimated transition function (which characterizes probability to transit from a given
price at some point in time to a certain price at the next time point) corroborates this finding. The
long-run limit of the price distribution is derived from this function. It predicts that no price
convergence clubs are to be expected in the long run.
The results obtained evidence poor market integration over 1994-2000, since only about one third
of Russian regions can be deemed as integrated with the national market. However, they
unambiguously suggest that the Russian market moved towards integration until about the end of
1999. It seems that by that time price convergence in Russia completed, having reached a “natural”
limit of market integration. A comparison demonstrates that price dispersion across Russia in the
last years is comparable with that across US, the economy that is deemed as highly integrated.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The fast switch in the early 1990s from the centrally planned economy to that governed by the
market principles, along with the political changes of that time, gave rise to dramatic regional
fragmentation of the economic space of Russia. (Berkowitz and DeJong (2003) as well as
Gluschenko (2003) discuss this process in more detail.) Therefore the creation – or recovery, if one
would prefer to say so – of its single economic space became a severe problem challenging the
country. It is even believed that a progress in solving this problem can be deemed as an important
indication of successfulness of the Russian market reforms in general.
A “core” of the single economic space is goods market integration. Results of studies by
Gluschenko (2002a, 2003) suggest that after a period of growing disconnectedness of the Russian
market, the improvement of market integration started in 1994. Nevertheless, the market still is not
near to completely integrated. Gluschenko (2002a) reveals a number of region-specific economic
forces impeding integration, and Berkowitz and DeJong (2001, 2003) find macroeconomic and
some other region-specific “anti-integration” forces.
These papers find the temporal pattern of market integration in Russia, but they do not provide an
insight into its spatial set-up, since, exploiting the cross-sectional approach, the results are averaged
across regions of the country. It is to reveal the spatial pattern of goods market integration in Russia
with the use of time-series analysis that is the main object of this study. By the spatial pattern is
meant a state of each individual region of the country: whether it is integrated over a certain span of
time, and if not, whether it moves towards integration. One more object is to characterize the
movement of the national market as a whole to integration in some additional – as compared to
earlier papers – aspects. Dynamics of cross-sectional distribution of regional prices receives the
study for this. The source data for the empirical analysis are time series of the cost of a staples
basket across 75 regions of Russia for 1994-2000 with monthly frequency, the cost for Russia as a
whole being used as a representative of the national market.
The logical order of the study is as follows. With the use of nonlinear cointegration analysis,
Russian regions are divided into three groups: (a) regions integrated with the national market; (b)
non-integrated regions tending to integration with the national market; and (c) non-integrated
regions without such a trend. As this pattern remains open the issue of the presence of price
convergence clubs among regional markets, it is supplemented with the analysis of Granger
causality across region pairs, characterizing the extensiveness of integration linkages between
regions, and answering the question of whether the national market is fragmented to a few isolated
submarkets. When there are both regions tending and not tending to integration, the resulting trend
of the entire market is a priori unclear. Examining the behavior of price dispersion (analyzing σ-
convergence) sheds light on the issue. Besides that, it verifies the above division of regions into
groups, and reveals whether non-integration is due to price divergence or, predominantly, to
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persistent differences in prices. To obtain more detailed properties of the integration evolution, the
entire cross-sectional distribution of prices is estimated for a sequence of points in time.
Multimodality of the distribution is an indication that there may be price convergence clubs. Having
obtained this sequence of distributions, the transition process between them, i.e., price mobility of
regions, is studied. The contribution of relative mobility (changes in order of regions along the scale
of relative prices) and absolute mobility (transition of regions between levels of prices, i.e., price
classes) to changes in price inequality is traced as well as a stochastic kernel – a generalization of a
transition probability matrix – is estimated. At last, this kernel is used to derive the long-run limit of
the price distribution in order to judge whether price convergence clubs are expected to arise in the
long run.
Of 75 Russian regions, 36% are found integrated with the national market over 1994-2000; 44% are
non-integrated regions tending to integration with it (the speed of convergence of regional prices to
the Russian level varying from 0.7% to 8.9% per month); and 20% have no such a trend. Granger
causality tests suggest that, on average, price disturbances are transmitted – in either direction –
between a given region and 62% of the rest ones, thus evidencing rather high degree of regional
connectedness; isolated submarkets are not found. Being represented by region, the results of the
time series analysis are temporally averaged. Therefore, they supplement the results of Gluschenko
(2002a, 2003). Taken jointly, these results provide a comprehensive, “two-dimensional” – across
time and space – pattern of market integration in Russia.
It is found that σ-convergence of regional prices takes place, implying that, despite the presence of
regions not tending to integration, the predominant trend is the improvement in market integration.
The shape of the cross-sectional distribution of prices tends to be more regular and narrower over
time, however, keeping a long right-hand tail that is due to difficult-to-access regions. The
distribution is unimodal, suggesting the absence of price convergence clubs. Using the Gini
correlation coefficient as a measure of relative mobility, it is found that the decrease in the price
inequality almost is not due to relative mobility. The main contribution belongs to absolute
mobility; the estimated stochastic kernel corroborates this finding. The long-run limit of the price
distribution is unimodal, so predicting no price convergence clubs in the long run.
The issue of market integration in transition economies has been the subject of a number of studies.
Using cointegration analysis, Gardner and Brooks (1994), Goodwin et al. (1999), and Berkowitz et
al. (1998) examine price dispersion among Russian cities in the early years of the transition (up to
1995). They find the Russian market weakly integrated, yet having encouraging signs of the
improvement. (An early version of the paper by Berkowitz et al. (1998) is even titled “Transition in
Russia: It’s Happening”.) Subsequently, Berkowitz and DeJong (1999) reveal the “Red Belt” as a
culprit behind the fragmentation of the Russian market; and then Berkowitz and DeJong (2001,
2003) estimate a segment of the integration trajectory for Russia (which is corroborated by
Gluschenko (2003) who applies a different methodology). Cointegration and threshold relationships
are analyzed across 7 regions of Western Siberia in Gluschenko (2001a), and across 11 aggregated
economic territories of Russia in Gluschenko (2002b); both integrated and non-integrated
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region/territory pairs are found. However, these results should be treated with caution. A caveat is
that regional CPIs were used as a price representative; but as found later by Gluschenko (2001b, c),
they are sufficiently biased, overstating inter-regional differences.
Conway (1999), using data from 1993–1996 for three commodities, examines price convergence
among four market locations within Kiev, Ukraine. He finds significant evidence of price
convergence due to arbitrage by buyers and sellers at these markets, but sizeable and sustained
divergences from the law of one price have remained as well. Cushman et al. (2001) examine the
law of one price with 5 food prices over an 11-month period in Kiev, during the early 1991–1992
period of Ukraine’s transition to independence. They compare these prices with the prices of similar
goods in the US. Cointegration between Ukrainian and US price time series with a (linear) trend is
deemed as an evidence of price convergence. Although the law of one price did not hold during the
period, the commodity real exchange rates are found to have possessed deterministic trends that
were in the direction of closing the initial considerable price gap.
This paper also relates to papers analyzing internal market integration in advanced market
economies, such as Engel and Rogers (1996), Parsley and Wei (1996), and Rogers (2002). More
distantly, it relates as well to countless papers on analysis of the law of one price in the international
context, and purchasing power parity, most sufficient of which were surveyed by Rogoff (1996),
and Sarno and Taylor (2002). Noteworthy is also a relationship with the literature on empirics of
economic growth (which is voluminous, too, see Durlauf and Quah, 1999). On the one hand,
methodology of examining convergence in the economic growth context is applied here to price
dynamics,1 and, on the other hand, the time-series method of analyzing price convergence that is put
forward in the paper seems to be useful to analyze, e.g., income convergence.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, methodology of the analysis
and the data used are described. In Section 3, empirical results of the time series and price
distribution dynamics analysis are presented. Conclusions are drawn in Section 4.
2. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
2.1. Strategy of the analysis
Time series analysis. Perfect integration of a spatially separated goods market implies that there
are no impediments to the movement of goods between all its spatial segments, i.e., regions of the
country. In other words, perfectly integrated market operates like a single market despite its spatial
                                                
1 Michael Beenstock has pointed out the resemblance of the convergence problem in economic growth and the problem
of price dynamics.
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separation.  Then the price of a (tradable) good across regions is uniform, i.e., the law of one price
holds, inter-regional arbitrage maintaining the law to hold. Thus, the law of one price can be used as
a theoretical benchmark for empirical analyzing internal market integration.
As mentioned in Introduction, there are two stages in the evolution of market integration in Russia,
namely, the early stage of progressive disintegration beginning in January 1992, and the late stage
of improvement in integration beginning in about 1994. It is the late stage that is of interest in this
study. It is hypothesized that the Russian goods market should eventually come to the final steady
state of complete integration, that is, to the equality of prices across all regions. Currently, during
the late stage of the integration evolution, the market may be believed to be in transition towards
this steady state. Hence, it is expected that three groups of regions may exist at present: (a)
integrated regions, i.e., those being in the steady state of equality of prices; (b) non-integrated
regions tending to integration, i.e., those in which prices are catching up with each other; and,
maybe, (c) non-integrated regions having no such a trend. For brevity, hereafter regions from the
second group are referred to as “regions tending to integration”, and regions from the third group
are referred to as simply “non-integrated regions.”
Testing for equality of prices (or price levels) is the conventional exercise in studies of the law of
one price and purchasing power parity. Using a (predominantly linear) cointegration relationship, a
relative-price time series is classified as stationary or non-stationary. However, providing the “all or
nothing” answer, this traditional approach is impotent in revealing a transitional case, that is, the
case when some time series is not stationary over a given time span, but is tending to become a
stationary one with time. In order to overcome such a difficulty, a cointegration relationship with
nonlinear trend is used in this study.
Let prt and pst be the price of a good in regions r and s, correspondingly, at time t. To model
convergence of prices to equality, the time series of the relative price is taken to have the
asymptotically subsiding trend of deviations from the equality,
prt/pst = 1 + γeδt, δ<0 (1)
(to economize notations, the region indices for parameters – as well as for disturbances below – are
omitted). With γ = 0, Equation (1) takes the form
prt/pst = 1, (2)
which means that convergence of prices has been completed by the beginning of the time span
under consideration, hence, the law of one price holds for regions r and s.
Equations (1) and (2) imply convergence to the absolute price parity, i.e., to perfect integration
which is not a common instance in the real world. (For example, Engel and Rogers (1996) as well
as Parsley and Wei (1996) find price dispersion among US cities to depend strongly on distance.)
Therefore, there may be a persistent difference in prices between r and s that is induced by
“natural”, irremovable impediments to inter-regional trade such as physical distance and difficult
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 10
access to a number of regions. And so, it would be more realistic to relax the criterion for market
integration, allowing for such market frictions. Then convergence to the relative price parity would
be tested, that is, to an arbitrary constant ratio of prices, α, instead of 1 in (1) and (2). Such a
relaxation has been implemented in Gluschenko (2002a, 2003). The trouble is that this α should
reflect the effect of “natural” market frictions only, and not that of artificial ones impeding market
integration. But in the context of pairwise time series analysis, there is no way to separately identify
these effects. That is why the strict version of the law of one price is adopted as the benchmark of
integration, any deterministic difference in prices interpreting as an indication of non-integration.
Certainly, the degree of Russia’s market integration may be understated to some extent because of
this. And so, the aim of the further lines of the analysis is not only to obtain additional aspects of the
pattern, but also to verify results based on the above models.
To derive a testable version of the theoretical relationship (1), stochastic disturbances, νt, are taken
into account, supposing them to be a (first-order) autoregressive process:
Prst = ln(1 + γeδt) + νt,   νt = (λ + 1)νt–1 + εt, (3)
where Prst ≡ ln(prt/pst) is the price differential, εt is white noise, and γ, δ, and λ are parameters to be
estimated. Substituting the second equation in (3) into the first one gives the nonlinear model to be
estimated and tested:
∆Prst = λPrs,t–1 + ln(1 + γeδt) – (λ + 1)ln(1 + γeδ(t – 1)) + εt. (4)
It is tested whether time series {Prst} has no unit root, i.e., that the process is stationary around the
trend, and if so, whether the time series does have a subsiding trend, i.e., γ ≠ 0 and δ < 0. That is,
the hypotheses tested are H1: λ = 0 (against λ < 0); H2: γ = 0 (against γ ≠ 0); and H3: δ ≥ 0 (against δ
< 0). Throughout the paper, the 10% significance level is adopted.
To test hypothesis H1, the Phillips-Perron test is performed, which eliminates serial correlation from
the residuals, using the Newey-West (1994) automatic bandwidth selection method with the Bartlett
spectral kernel. (This test is chosen in order not to lose degrees of freedom through adding
additional lags to the regression itself.) However, the test statistic (which is the t-ratio of λ) for an
AR(1) process of the form (4) is not documented in the literature. Therefore, to derive p-values of
the test, the empirical distribution of this statistic under the null hypothesis was estimated,
implementing a large set of simulations. Appendix A provides details as well as results obtained.
If the unit root in (4) is rejected, hypotheses H2 and H3 are tested; provided the stationarity of the
time series, the ordinary t-test is valid for this. If either of them is not rejected, this means that there
is no deterministic trend of the given form in the time series (or – when δ > 0 – that the trend is not
subsiding). In such an event, as well as in the case of non-rejection of unit root, it is tested whether
the process is governed by law (2), as described below.
The joint rejection of H1, H2 and H3 is interpreted as evidence that the time series has
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 11
asymptotically subsiding trend, fluctuating around it. Hence, prices in r and s are converging to
equality, and these regions are classed with ones tending to integration. Coefficient δ defines the
convergence speed. The sign of γ shows the direction of convergence: with γ < 0, prices in r catch
up with prices in s, increasing over time faster that those in s; with γ > 0, the prices in r are rising
slower than in s. (Per se, γ is the initial – at t = 0 – deviation of prices from parity.) Coefficient λ is
interpreted as an indicator of the speed of dying out deviations from trajectory (1) that are caused by
random shocks; θ = ln(0.5)/ln(1 + λ) defines the half-life time of the deviations. (With λ = 0, i.e. in
the case of unit root, θ = ∞, meaning that the effect of random shocks is permanent; hence, there is
no return to trajectory (1). With λ = –1 implying the absence of autocorrelation, θ = 0; hence, the
return to trajectory (1) is instantaneous).
Using the same way as above, a testable version of (2) is arrived at:
Prst = νt,   νt = (λ + 1)νt–1 + εt, (5)
or
∆Prst = λPrs,t–1 + εt, (6)
which is the conventional AR(1) model.
The hypothesis tested is whether the time series has unit root, H′1: λ = 0 (against λ < 0). The same
procedure as for testing H1 is used, taking MacKinnon’s (1996) p-values for regression without
intercept and trend. The rejection of the unit root is interpreted as evidence that the time series
fluctuates around zero, that is, around equality of prices in r and s (θ defining the half-life time of
the deviations from the equality). Therefore, these regions are classed with integrated ones. If unit
root is not rejected, regions are deemed as non-integrated.
Noteworthy are different roles of parameters γ and δ vs. parameter λ. The first two characterize the
long-run behavior of a relative price trajectory, while λ defines the short-run properties of
adjustment toward this trajectory (which is, in the degenerate case of AR(1), the straight line along
the time axis, representing the price parity).
There is a peculiarity in price dynamics in Russia: a number of regional price time series contain a
structural break caused by the August 1998 financial crisis. The period of break is not uniform
across regions, varying from 1998:08 to 1999:02. With such a break, the time series might appear to
have a (spurious) deterministic trend, so biasing the inference towards non-rejection of a trend in
(4), and towards non-rejection of a unit root in (6). To avoid this, (4) and (6) are augmented for
breaks, taking the forms
∆Prst = λPrs,t–1 + ln(1 + (γ + γBBt(t*))eδt) – (λ + 1)ln(1 + (γ + γBB t–1(t*))eδ(t – 1)) + εt, (4*)
and
∆Prst = λPrs,t–1 + γB(Bt(t*) – (λ + 1)B t–1(t*)) + εt, (6*)
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where Bt(t*) is the structural change dummy such that Bt(t*) = 1 if t < t*, and zero otherwise. The
period of break is found by estimating (4*) and (6*) for t* = 1998:08,…,1999:02, and choosing its
value that yields the least sum of squared residuals.2
In (4*), the sign of γ + γB shows the direction of convergence before the break, and that since the
break is shown by the sign of γ. This time γ can equal zero; such an event implies that prices in r
and s have become close to equal from the break on. If the signs of γ and γB are the same, the break
causes a price jump towards parity; and opposite signs imply the jump away from parity, provided
that |γ| > |γB|. (The opposite inequality produces an exotic case of “overshooting”: the jump crosses
the price parity line, thus changing the direction of convergence since the break. There are no such
cases among estimates obtained except for insignificant γs.) Equation (6*) is constructed so that the
price jump is always parity-directed, in order to test whether r and s have become integrated since
the period of structural change. Given γB > 0, the crisis caused price-cutting in r; otherwise, it
increased the relative price in the region. The hypotheses tested for (4*) are the same as for (4) but
H2 which is substituted for H*2: γB = 0 (against γB ≠ 0). For (6*), the analogous hypothesis denoted
H*′2 is tested in addition to H′1. Hypotheses H1 and H′1 are tested through the same procedure as
above, however, using estimated empirical distributions of the unit root test statistic for time series
with breaks; see Appendix A.
Thus, each time series {Prt} is analyzed as follows:
Step 1. Model (4*) is estimated and tested. If hypotheses H1, H*2, H3 and are jointly rejected, regions
r and s are deemed as tending to integration, {Prst} containing a structural break. Otherwise, if the
structural break is rejected, the analysis comes to Step 2, and if it is not (and H1 or/and H3 is not
rejected), the analysis continues from Step 3.
Step 2. Model (4) is estimated and tested. If hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 are jointly rejected, r and s
are deemed as tending to integration. Otherwise, the analysis comes to Step 3.
Step 3. Model (6*) is estimated and tested. If there is no structural break (hypothesis H*′2 is not
rejected), the analysis comes to Step 4. Otherwise, if the unit root is rejected, r and s are deemed as
integrated (since the period of the break), and if it is not, they are deemed as non-integrated, {Prst}
containing a structural break.
Step 4. Model (6) is estimated and tested. If the unit root is rejected, r and s are deemed as
integrated; otherwise, they are deemed as non-integrated.
                                                
2 Specification (6*) is derived from (5), augmenting the first equation in (5) with the break variable. It differs from the
classical regression for testing for structural break in AR(1), like, e.g., in Perron and Vogelsang (1992), which includes
two dummies, a pulse one and a level one. It is readily seen that the second term in (6*) combines their properties.
Given unit root (λ = 0), it produces a pulse at t*; given no autocorrelation (λ = –1), we have a step spanning 1,…, t*–1
(i.e., a one-time jump in the intercept from γB to 0 at t*); with –1 < λ < 0, a superposition of the pulse and step is
produced. But the cost is nonlinearity of the regression with respect to coefficients, and the need to specially estimate
the distribution of unit root test statistic for this specification.
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There are 75 series of regional prices for Russia, yielding 2775 region pairs. A standard way of
reducing such a mass of pairwise comparisons in the literature on purchasing power parity and the
law of one price is to take one of locations as a benchmark, as, e.g., in Parsley and Wei (1996), and
Gardner and Brooks (1994), to name a few. It is this way that is exploited in the current line of the
analysis. The national market as a whole is chosen as the benchmark (since, in the intra-national
context, such a benchmark is believed to be natural and much more reasonable than an arbitrary
region). Thus, integration of each region with the entire national market is analyzed, using only
region-Russia pairs. That is, index s in the above relationships is fixed, and is set to s = 0, p0t
denoting the price in Russia as a whole. (This price is close to the mean of prices across all regions,
however, does not coincide with it; see the next section. For brevity, nevertheless, it will be referred
to as “average Russian price”). And so, s is omitted hereafter; i.e., Prt denotes percentage difference
in prices between region r and Russia as a whole: Prt ≡ ln(prt/p0t).
 Certainly, so reducing the set of pairs, the pattern becomes rougher and looses many details.
However, it is believed to be in good agreement with the detailed pattern, based on Gluschenko
(2002b), where results of analysis across pairs of Russian economic territories are compared with
those across the territory-Russia pairs. Theoretically, if two regions are integrated (or tending to
integration) with the national market, then they should be integrated (tending to integration) with
one another. Practically, this might fail, but only because of low power of unit root tests. There is a
caveat though. There may be integration or price convergence between two (and more) regions
without integration with, or convergence to, the national market. Such a fact would imply that there
are “price convergence clubs” among regional markets, an analog of convergence clubs in
economic growth (see, e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). Using comparison with the benchmark
rather than all pairwise comparisons, this issue remains open. It is to be clarified by additional
analyses.
One of them is the Granger causality analysis that does involve inter-regional comparisons. By
conducting the Granger causality test, it is sought whether price disturbances are transmitted across
regions. To avoid spurious causality resulting from the presence of trends in both tested time series,
the series are detrended and debreaked (the latter is done to eliminate approximation of structural
break by a trend). Letting P′rt denote detrended and debreaked Prt, the bivariate regression
P′rt = ϕ0(r) + ϕ1(r)P′r,t – 1 +…+ ϕm(r)P′r,t – m + ψ1(r)P′s,t – 1 +…+ ψm(r)P′s,t – m + ε(r)t
P′st = ϕ0(s) + ϕ1(s)P′s,t – 1 +…+ ϕm(s)P′s,t – m + ψ1(s)P′r,t – 1 +…+ ψm(s)P′r,t – m + ε(s)t (7)
is estimated across t for region pair (r, s), and hypotheses ψ1(r) =…= ψm(r) = 0 (P′s does not Granger
cause P′r) and ψ1(s) =…= ψm(s) = 0 (P′r does not Granger cause P′s) are tested. If a hypothesis, say,
the first one, is rejected, this suggests that prices in s are responsive to changes in prices in r,
evidencing in favor of the existence of integration linkages between these regions.
Having run the Granger causality test for every region pair, the results can be summarized in an
R×R – where R is the number of regions – matrix C = (Csr) such that Csr = 1 if P′r Granger causes
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 14
P′s, and Csr = 0 otherwise; Crr ≡ 1. In fact, this is the adjacency matrix of a “causality graph”
displaying direct price linkages between regions. Regions r and s are linked indirectly if Csr = 0, but
Csq = 1 and Cqr = 1. This means that there is a path from r to s in the graph represented by C. (In
this case, the path length is 2.) The (R – 1)-th power of C provides a pattern of all direct and indirect
linkages; its zero rs-th element implies that there are no any linkages between r and s. This pattern
answers the question of whether the national market is fragmented to a few isolated submarkets. If
rows and columns of CR–1 can be reordered so that it becomes a block diagonal matrix, then this is
the case. It is such submarkets that may potentially be the price convergence clubs.
In addition, spatial Granger causality is analyzed in order to examine effects of spatial lags,
proceeding from Rey and Montouri (1999). A region’s spatial lag, P′“r-1”,t, is a weighted average of
(detrended and debreaked) prices in its neighboring regions, with the weights being obtained from
the simple contiguity matrix normalized so that its column sums are all 1. Using (7) with P′s
replaced by P′“r-1”, it is tested whether P′“r-1” Granger cause P′r.
Analyzing distribution dynamics. When there are both regions tending to integration and non-
integrated regions, the resulting trend of the entire market is a priori unclear. Then the behavior of
the entire cross-section distribution of prices can shed light on the issue. It is reasonable to believe
that if prices converge over time to some common level, then the market as a whole is moving
towards integration. A simple testable version is known in the economic growth literature – e.g.,
Sala-i-Martin  (1996) – as σ-convergence.
Reformulated in terms of prices, it is defined as follows: regional prices are converging, if their
dispersion tends to decrease over time, that is,
σ(Pt)/σ(Pt–τ) < 1, (8)
where σ(Pt) is the standard deviation of prices Prt over r =1,…, R at a given point in time. The
occurrence of σ-convergence in the case when the existence of non-integrated regions has been
detected is evidence that the trend to convergence of prices prevails over the trend to divergence
induced by those regions. Along with analyzing σ-convergence for the entire set of regions, it is
also applied to each of three region groups obtained through the time series analysis in order to
verify this separation. The group of regions tending to integration is expected to display σ-
convergence; and the group of integrated regions is expected to have near-constant σ. The group of
non-integrated regions would show σ-divergence if non-integration is due to random walking or
deterministic price divergence. However, if the reason of non-integration is constant persistent
differences in prices, a near-constant σ is to be expected.
One more concept of convergence in the economic growth literature is β-convergence. If a cross-
sectional regression
Prt = α + βt–τ,tPr,t–τ + εr (9)
yields βt–τ,t < 1 then it is said that the data set exhibits β-convergence (Sala-i-Martin, 1996). Wodon
and Yitzhaki (2001) show that there is a relationship between these types of convergence:
σ(Pt)/σ(Pt–τ) = βt–τ,t/ρ, (10)
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where ρ is the correlation coefficient between Pt–τ and Pt. If (8) holds, then it must be that there is
β-convergence, because ρ < 1. But the reverse is not true for the same reason. Thus, β-convergence
does not necessarily imply σ-convergence (hence, σ-convergence is a sufficient – but not necessary
– condition for β-convergence).
Being merely one of characteristics of the price distribution, the evolution of σ(Pt) provides rather
poor information on features of price dynamics. To reveal more detailed properties of the
integration evolution, the behavior of distribution of regional prices as such, ft(P), is analyzed. The
cross-section distributions are non-parametrically estimated in a number of points in time with the
use of a kernel density estimator. The Gaussian kernel is adopted; formally, the estimate of a
probability density looks like
∑ 
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where R, recall, denotes the number of regions, and h is the Silverman (1986) smoothing
bandwidth. The distribution is estimated for entire Russia and for the three groups of regions.
Judging from unimodality or multimodality of the distribution, the question of whether there are
price convergence clubs in the evolution of market integration is to be answered.
Having obtained a sequence of distributions {ft(P)}, the next issue is to characterize the transition
process between them, i.e., price mobility of regions. As Fields and Ok (2001) note in their survey,
the very notion of mobility is not well-defined; the mobility literature does not provide a unified
discourse of analysis (nor is there a unified terminology). Nonetheless, there is agreement regarding
two main concepts of mobility in the economical and sociological literature. The first one is relative
(or rank) mobility which concerns changes in ranking of, in our case, regions by the price level. The
second concept is absolute (or quantity) mobility concerning changes in regions’ price levels
themselves. Both concepts are used in the below analysis.
To measure relative mobility, the approach proposed by Yitzhaki and Wodon (2001) is adopted
(their notation changed to correspond). The dispersion of prices, or price inequality, is measured by
the Gini coefficient:
t
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t pR
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where pt = {prt}, and kt = {krt} is regions’ ranks in ascending prices prt. Here, as the Gini coefficient
needs arguments to be positive, the (relative) prices themselves are used rather than their
logarithms.
The Gini symmetric index of mobility is defined as:
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that is, as a weighted average of asymmetric mobility indices quantifying mobility in forward and
reverse directions in time:
Mt–τ,t = (1 – Γt–τ,t)/2, Mt,t–τ = (1 – Γt,t–τ)/2. (14)
In turn, Γs are the Gini correlation coefficients:
),Cov(
),Cov(
,
τ−τ−
τ−
τ− =Γ
tt
tt
tt kp
kp
, 
),Cov(
),Cov(
,
tt
tt
tt kp
kp τ−
τ− =Γ . (15)
These mobility indices can vary from 0 and 1. (The original Yitzhaki and Wodon (2001) index is
bounded between 0 and 2; for easier interpretation, this range is normalized to [0, 1] in (14) by
division by 2). If St–τ,t = Mt–τ,t = Mt,t–τ = 0, there is no mobility. If St–τ,t = Mt–τ,t = Mt,t–τ = 1, mobility
is “perfect”, i.e., there is a total reversal in the ranks. The case of St–τ,t = Mt–τ,t = Mt,t–τ = 0.5 implies
random mobility, meaning that pt–τ and pt are statistically independent. Notice that Γs are not
sensitive to monotonic transformations of distributions in t – τ and t, and so, such changes as a shift
of the median or/and, e.g., a decrease of the variance – which just mean convergence of prices – are
not captured by the Gini mobility indices (indicating the absence of mobility).
It is absolute mobility that is responsible for such changes. One measure of absolute mobility that
has a rather wide use in the mobility literature is an estimate of βt–τ,t in (9); see, e.g., Jarvis and
Jenkins (1998), and Beenstock (2003).3 A possible modification is to estimate it from a Gini
regression (Olkin and Yitzhaki, 1992), regressing Prt on kr,t–τ rather than Pr,t–τ in (9). In fact, such an
estimate, denoted by β*t–τ,t, is an instrumental variable estimate in which price in t – τ is
instrumented by rank. Then, as shown by Wodon and Yitzhaki (2001), the measures of relative and
absolute mobility can be related with one another:
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For more transparent interpretation, the ratio of average prices in (16) may be replaced with unity
(as it is close to 1 because of normalizing to the price in Russia as a whole). Then it is seen that
convergence of prices occurs if absolute mobility exceeds relative mobility. The equality of these
kinds of mobility would keep the Gini coefficient unchanged; and the predominance of relative
mobility over absolute one would lead to price divergence. Benefiting from the Wodon-Yitzhaki
relationship, β*t–τ,t is simply calculated from (16) in this paper rather than estimated from a Gini
regression.
One more way of analyzing absolute mobility is exploited in the paper, following Quah (1996). Let
M(t–τ,t)(P(i),P(j))dP be the fraction of regions being in (infinitesimal) price class i with prices from P(i)
                                                
3 If β = 1, there is no mobility; β < 1 implies a movement towards the mean (downward mobility among the high-price
regions, and upward mobility among the low-price ones), which is equivalent to β-convergence; β > 1 implies a
movement away from the mean, which is equivalent to β-divergence. Thus, the greater β – 1, the higher mobility.
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to P(i) + dP at t – τ, and in price class j with prices from P(j) to P(j) + dP at t. Covering all classes, P
∈ (–∞, ∞), M(t,t–τ) is an operator mapping the price distribution from period t – τ to period t:
ft(P) = M⋅ft–τ(P). (17)
This operator is a stochastic kernel,4 or a transition probability function which is the generalization
of a transition probability matrix. (M may be viewed as such a matrix with infinite number of rows
and columns, {i} and {j} being continuous.) It is readily seen that the stochastic kernel is a
probability density of prices at t conditional on prices at t – 1: M = f(PtPt–τ). Then (17) can be
written as
τ−τ−τ−τ−
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∫= ttttttt dPPfPPfPf )()()( . (18)
The stochastic kernel is estimated in a manner like the univariate distributions are; see (11):
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(The numerator in (19) is the estimate of the joint distribution of Pt–τ and Pt, and the denominator is
the estimate – by Formula (11) – of the marginal distribution.)
Under the assumption of time-invariance of the stochastic kernel, i.e., of the underlying transition
mechanism, the application of transformation (17) to ft(P) n times yields a distribution for t + nτ,
that is,
 ft+nτ(P) = Mn⋅ft(P). (20)
Taking n → ∞ yields the ergodic distribution, f∞(P), i.e., such that
f∞(P) = M∞⋅f∞(P), (21)
where M∞ is the limit of  Mn with n → ∞. The ergodic distribution is the long-run limit of the
distribution of prices. Depending on unimodality or multimodality of the ergodic distribution, it can
be judged whether the existence of convergence clubs is to be expected in the long run.
To estimate M∞, relationship (20) is applied, with numerically integrating in (18). Since M∞
degenerates into f(PtPt–τ) = f∞(Pt) for each Pt–τ, the fulfillment of this condition accurate to 10–7 is
used as a criterion of convergence of Mn to M∞.
2.2. Data
The cost of the basket of 25 food goods (defined as the standard by Goskomstat between January
1997 through June 2000) is used as a price representative for the analysis. This basket covers about
one third of foodstuffs involved in the Russian CPI; but unlike the CPI, it has constant weights
                                                
4 Quah (1996) as well as Durlauf and Quah (1999) provide much more general formalization.
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across regions and time; Goskomstat (1996) describes its composition.5 The costs of the basket
were obtained directly from Goskomstat.
The information has been collected in capital cities of the Russian regions; 75 of the 89 regions of
Russia are covered. The data are lacking for 10 autonomous okrugs, the Chechen Republic, and the
Republic of Ingushetia. Besides that, two more regions are omitted. The city of Moscow is a “city-
region”, being a separate subject of the Russian Federation, and at the same time it is the capital city
of the surrounding Moscow Oblast; the same holds for St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Oblast.
Therefore only these “cities-regions” are present in the sample, while the relevant surrounding
oblasts are not. The data are monthly, spanning January 1994 through December 2000 (though the
data set begins in 1992, the early stage of the market integration evolution is discarded). Thus, the
number of the time observations equals 84.
The cost of the basket for Russia as a whole is calculated by Goskomstat as the weighed average of
regional costs (using the ratio of region’s population in the population of Russia as the regional
weight). Thus, the average Russian price does not coincide with the average over regions, though
they are rather close to one another. This implies that the mean of relative prices prt/p0t can deviate –
to some extent – from unity, and the mean of their logarithms can deviate from zero.
There are missing observations in the time series used. The most of them occur in 1994. For this
year, there are 42 missing observations (4.7% of the yearly total) in 17 regional time series. The
remainder of the data set has only 9 missing observations. To fill the gaps, the missing prices are
approximated, using the food component of the regional monthly CPIs. The interpolated value of
price prt is the arithmetic mean of the nearest known preceding price inflated to t, and the nearest
known succeeding price deflated to t; see Gluschenko (2003). For example, if an observation for
one month is missed, its restored value looks like prt = (pr,t–1⋅πrt + pr,t+1/πr,t+1)/2, where πrτ is the
food CPI for month τ in region r.
At last, a caveat with the data used should be mentioned. As regional wholesale prices are not
available, retail prices are analyzed, which embody region-specific distribution costs. Varying
across regions, they may cause violation of the law of one price even if wholesale prices do
obey the law. There are two ways of dealing with the problem as suggested by Gluschenko
(2002a). The first is to produce proxies of wholesale prices from retail prices. However, given
monthly price time series, this way is not proper here, since data on distribution costs and retail-
wholesale margins are available only on a yearly basis. Thus, the second way is forced to
follow, interpreting the spatial variation of distribution costs as an additional indication of poor
integration. In fact, this means extending the notion of market integration, considering
integration of the goods market as such in conjunction with integration of the related markets
                                                
5 The basket includes: rye-wheat bread, wheat bread, flour, rice, millet, vermicelli, potatoes, cabbages, carrots, onions,
apples, sugar, beef, poultry, cooked sausage, partially smoked sausage, frozen fish, milk, sour cream, butter, cottage
cheese, rennet cheese, eggs, margarine, and vegetable oil.
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for distribution services and labor in retail trade.6 (Indeed, organized crime responsible for a
sufficient portion of inter-regional price dispersion in Russia acts both on the inter-regional
level, forcing wholesale prices to rise, and on the local level, causing additional traders’
expenses raising distribution costs.) On the other hand, basing on results reported by
Gluschenko (2002a, 2003), it may be believed that patterns for retail and proxied wholesale
prices would not sufficiently deviate from each other.
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
3.1. Spatial pattern of market integration
Table 1 summarizes results on integration of each individual region with the entire national market,
which are obtained with the use of models (4*), (4), (6*), and (6). For a given region, the table reports
results for one of these models, depending on which of them is accepted as describing the price behavior
in this region. Reporting all parameters – λ, γ, γB, and δ – means acceptance of model (4*); reporting λ,
γ, and δ implies that (4) is accepted; thus, the region is deemed as tending to integration. If there are only
λ and γB in the table, model (6*) is accepted; and the only parameter λ is reported for (6). In the last two
cases, the region is deemed as integrated if the unit root is rejected (the p-value of the Phillips-Perron
test is less than, or equal to, 0.1); otherwise the region is deemed as non-integrated.
Results for each model are provided in Appendix B. In Table 1 as well as in Tables B1 and B2
of Appendix B, standard deviations are in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively; p-values of the Phillips-Perron test (denoted “p(λ=0)” in the
tables of Appendix B) exceeding 10% are marked with bold italics. The horizontal borders in
Table 1 separate the economic territories (ekonomicheskiy rayon) from one another. The
composition of these territories and their names can be seen from the map in Figure 1 below.
Regions are arranged geographically in the table, accordingly to their traditional ordering in
Goskomstat’s publications until July 2000 (except for the Kaliningrad Oblast which is added to
the Northwestern Territory).
Of all the 75 regions, 27, or 36%, are deemed as integrated with the national market; and there are
15 (20%) non-integrated regions having no trend to integration. The minimum p-value of the unit
root test among regions for which the unit root is not rejected in model (6) or (6*) equals 0.158, and
the rest of them exceed 0.2. Thus, the results of testing can be believed as rather reliable in spite of
low power of the unit root test.
                                                
6 Such a component of distribution costs like rent does not fit in with this. However, rent does not play a noticeable role
in costs of the Russian trade, coming to about 1% in retail prices of goods (as Appendix A in Gluschenko (2002a)
evidences).
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Table 1. Summary of time-series estimations and unit root tests
Region
Phillips-
Perron test
p-value
λ γ
Structural break
(γB)
δ
  1. Rep. of Karelia 0.002 -0.423 (0.091) 0.186 (0.030)*** -0.011 (0.004)***
  2. Rep. of Komid 0.002 -0.439 (0.092) 0.005 (0.058) 0.227 (0.072)*** -0.017 (0.006)***
  3. Arkhangelsk Obl.d 0.006 -0.428 (0.093) 0.195 (0.049)*** 0.119 (0.039)*** -0.014 (0.003)***
  4. Vologda Obl. 0.001 -0.347 (0.089) -0.043 (0.010)***
  5. Murmansk Obl. 0.233 -0.013 (0.009) -0.207 (0.036)***
  6. Saint Petersburg City 0.420 -0.028 (0.024) -0.183 (0.036)***
  7. Novgorod Obl. 0.000 -0.677 (0.106) -0.034 (0.007)***
  8. Pskov Obl. 0.027 -0.181 (0.069) -0.088 (0.021)***
  9. Kaliningrad Obl. 0.017 -0.173 (0.063) -0.125 (0.030)***
10. Bryansk Obl.a 0.066 -0.274 (0.083) -0.385 (0.108)*** 0.147 (0.088)* -0.018 (0.004)***
11. Vladimir Obl. 0.030 -0.175 (0.067) -0.122 (0.018)***
12. Ivanovo Obl. 0.002 -0.301 (0.084) -0.090 (0.012)***
13. Kaluga Obl. 0.035 -0.239 (0.073) -0.236 (0.075)*** -0.042 (0.017)**
14. Kostroma Obl. 0.422 -0.078 (0.053) -0.090 (0.028)***
15. Moscow Citya 0.788 -0.003 (0.013) -0.070 (0.028)**
16. Oryol Obl. 0.015 -0.328 (0.085) -0.313 (0.029)*** -0.017 (0.003)***
17. Ryazan Obl. 0.019 -0.153 (0.060) -0.083 (0.019)***
18. Smolensk Obl. 0.000 -0.534 (0.101) -0.090 (0.036)** -0.133 (0.032)*** -0.009 (0.004)**
19. Tver Obl. 0.000 -0.344 (0.082) -0.118 (0.013)***
20. Tula Obl. 0.009 -0.299 (0.072) -0.145 (0.053)*** -0.082 (0.044)* -0.016 (0.005)***
21. Yaroslavl Obl. 0.000 -0.388 (0.088) -0.077 (0.009)***
22. Rep. of Mariy El 0.330 -0.014 (0.015)
23. Rep. of Mordovia 0.282 -0.015 (0.014) 0.125 (0.039)***
24. Chuvash Rep.b 0.661 -0.012 (0.018) -0.070 (0.027)**
25. Kirov Obl. 0.386 -0.050 (0.040) -0.125 (0.030)***
26. Nizhni Novgorod Obl.c 0.085 -0.129 (0.057) -0.099 (0.024)***
27. Belgorod Obl. 0.000 -0.470 (0.095) -0.261 (0.027)*** -0.012 (0.003)***
28. Voronezh Obl.a 0.000 -0.524 (0.098) -0.646 (0.142)*** 0.249 (0.129)* -0.029 (0.003)***
29. Kursk Obl. 0.000 -0.471 (0.097) -0.245 (0.025)*** -0.015 (0.003)***
30. Lipetsk Obl. 0.002 -0.468 (0.095) -0.391 (0.071)*** 0.134 (0.059)** -0.015 (0.003)***
31. Tambov Obl.b 0.004 -0.362 (0.082) -0.176 (0.046)*** -0.068 (0.033)** -0.007 (0.003)**
32. Rep. of Kalmykia b 0.000 -0.548 (0.103) -0.045 (0.038) -0.117 (0.037)*** -0.012 (0.005)**
33. Rep. of Tatarstan 0.000 -0.614 (0.101) -0.363 (0.058)*** 0.077 (0.045)* -0.008 (0.002)***
34. Astrakhan Obl. 0.000 -0.701 (0.106) -0.181 (0.020)*** -0.025 (0.005)***
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Region
Phillips-
Perron test
p-value
λ γ
Structural break
(γB)
δ
35. Volgograd Obl.d 0.000 -0.354 (0.084) -0.099 (0.015)***
36. Penza Obl. 0.026 -0.279 (0.078) -0.227 (0.027)*** -0.010 (0.003)**
37. Samara Obl. 0.000 -0.376 (0.087)
38. Saratov Obl. 0.014 -0.316 (0.082) -0.178 (0.035)*** -0.010 (0.005)**
39. Ulyanovsk Obl. 0.000 -0.577 (0.098) -0.600 (0.068)*** 0.152 (0.057)*** -0.013 (0.002)***
40. Rep. of Adygeya 0.000 -0.772 (0.108) -0.366 (0.068)*** 0.118 (0.059)** -0.018 (0.003)***
41. Rep. of Dagestan 0.000 -0.574 (0.101) -0.122 (0.023)*** -0.012 (0.005)**
42. Kabardian-Balkar Rep. 0.000 -0.231 (0.040) -0.828 (0.079)*** -0.093 (0.017)***
43. Karachaev-Cirkassian
      Rep. 0.158 -0.080 (0.044)
44. Rep. of Northern Ossetia 0.002 -0.445 (0.093) -0.243 (0.032)*** -0.025 (0.005)***
45. Krasnodar Krai 0.000 -0.619 (0.105) -0.430 (0.157)*** 0.234 (0.140)* -0.020 (0.005)***
46. Stavropol Krai 0.000 -0.554 (0.100) -0.165 (0.016)*** -0.009 (0.003)***
47. Rostov Obl. 0.000 -0.679 (0.106) -0.185 (0.012)*** -0.007 (0.002)***
48. Rep. of Bashkortostan d 0.006 -0.240 (0.073) -0.126 (0.024)***
49. Udmurt Rep.c 0.017 -0.185 (0.064) -0.129 (0.022)***
50. Kurgan Obl.c 0.007 -0.131 (0.042) -0.099 (0.031)***
51. Orenburg Obl.b 0.020 -0.167 (0.060) -0.110 (0.040)***
52. Perm Obl. 0.003 -0.372 (0.082) 0.160 (0.074)** -0.084 (0.039)**
53. Sverdlovsk Obl. 0.020 -0.292 (0.081) 0.119 (0.044)*** -0.021 (0.012)*
54. Chelyabinsk Obl. 0.000 -0.698 (0.105)
55. Rep. of Altai 0.000 -0.401 (0.088)
56. Altai Krai 0.506 -0.023 (0.024) 0.077 (0.039)*
57. Kemerovo Obl.e 0.000 -0.310 (0.069) 0.038 (0.015)**
58. Novosibirsk Obl.e 0.000 -0.306 (0.070) 0.033 (0.013)**
59. Omsk Obl.e 0.000 -0.578 (0.101) -0.910 (0.296)*** 0.667 (0.282)** -0.034 (0.005)***
60. Tomsk Obl. 0.000 -0.252 (0.071)
61. Tyumen Obl. 0.033 -0.138 (0.056) 0.068 (0.024)***
62. Rep. of Buryatia 0.005 -0.232 (0.073) 0.118 (0.022)***
63. Rep. of Tuva 0.331 -0.073 (0.046) 0.118 (0.044)***
64. Rep. of Khakasiae 0.017 -0.200 (0.068) 0.038 (0.018)**
65. Krasnoyarsk Krai 0.014 -0.196 (0.066) 0.070 (0.026)***
66. Irkutsk Obl.f 0.001 -0.342 (0.085) 0.147 (0.026)***
67. Chita Obl. 0.001 -0.450 (0.091) 0.298 (0.076)*** 0.106 (0.054)* -0.012 (0.003)***
68. Rep. of Sakha (Yakutia) 0.513 -0.007 (0.013)
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Region
Phillips-
Perron test
p-value
λ γ
Structural break
(γB)
δ
69. Jewish Autonomous Obl.f 0.003 -0.422 (0.091) 0.183 (0.045)*** 0.148 (0.035)*** -0.010 (0.003)***
70. Primorsky Krai 0.040 -0.282 (0.081) 0.545 (0.060)*** -0.008 (0.002)***
71. Khabarovsk Kraid 0.000 -0.571 (0.104) 0.298 (0.048)*** 0.143 (0.034)*** -0.007 (0.002)***
72. Amur Obl.c 0.006 -0.216 (0.063) 0.170 (0.028)***
73. Kamchatka Obl.d 0.790 -0.005 (0.014) 0.179 (0.063)***
74. Magadan Obl.d 0.478 -0.008 (0.010) 0.155 (0.051)***
75. Sakhalin Obl.d 0.535 -0.010 (0.014) 0.137 (0.055)**
a Break in 1998:08; b Break in 1998:10; c Break in 1998:11; d Break in 1998:12; e Break in 1999:01; f Break in 1999:02. Not marked
breaks are in 1998:09.
Comparing with Table B2 of Appendix B, one can see that taking the structural break into account
sufficiently increases the number of integrated regions: there are eight of them, for which the unit
root is not rejected in (6) while it is rejected in (6*). Recalling that the break dummy equals 1 before
the period of break, and 0 since it, this implies that these regions became integrated since the break.
Hence, the 1998 financial crisis facilitated price equalizing among Russian regions, so it improved
the pattern of regional integration. There is the only opposite case, in Saint Petersburg City, where
unit root is rejected in (6*), and is not in (6). The 1998 crisis caused persistent rise in prices there, as
compared to the average Russian price, thus it called forth non-integration with the national market.
The structural break is not rejected for 23 of 27 integrated regions. Of them, 15 regions have an
upward break, i.e., the crisis forced rise in relative prices in these regions. All of them are from the
European part of Russia. For eight regions, all from the Asian part of Russia (Siberia and the Far
East), the break is downward, implying decline in relative prices. The same pattern is valid for non-
integrated regions (of which, the structural break is rejected only for three), with the only exception
of the Republic of Mordovia. Thus, a consequence of the 1998 crises was coming prices in the
Asian and European parts of Russia together.
The number of regions deemed as tending to integration with the national market is 33, or 44% of the
total. For the most part (24 regions of 33, or 73%), convergence is “upward”, i.e., catching-up the
average Russian level by regions with low prices. The lowest starting price level, 0.17 (=1 + γ + γB),
among them has the Kabardino-Balkar Republic; the highest, 0.88, have the Republic of Dagestan.
There are nine regions (or 27% of 33 regions) with “downward” convergence from the starting
values of 1.12 in the Sverdlovsk Oblast and 1.54 in the Primorsky Krai as the low and high ends.
All these are regions from the Northern Territory, Ural, Siberia, and the Far East. The only region
with “upward” convergence on these territories is the Omsk Oblast (from Western Siberia). The
convergence speed expressed as a percentage (i.e., |eδ – 1|) varies from 0.7% (in the Tambov Oblast,
Rostov Oblast, and Khabarovsk Krai) to 8.9% (in the Kabardino-Balkar Republic) per month. Both
values occur in regions with “upward” convergence; the range for “downward” convergence is
0.7% to 8.1%. There is strong positive correlation between the starting price gap, |γ + γB|, and the
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convergence speed, in the case of upward convergence: the correlation coefficient equals 0.79.
However, the pattern is reverse for the downward convergence: the greater the gap, the slower
convergence, the correlation coefficient equaling –0.52.
The structural break is rejected for about a half of regions tending to integration, namely, for 16,
and is not for 17. The latter, in turn, are divided almost in half into those nine in which the break
accelerated convergence (γ and γB have the same signs), having pushed prices towards the Russian
average, and into eight regions where the break pushed prices away from the average Russian price
(γ and γB with opposite signs), thus slowing convergence down. There are two regions, the republics
of Komi and Kalmykia, with statistically insignificant γ, implying that prices there became near to
the average Russian price since the break on. Thus, these regions might be equally well classed as
integrated. Comparison of Tables B1 and B2 in Appendix B suggests that neglecting the structural
break would markedly distort the pattern. There are 12 cases, where the break is spuriously treated
as a trend in (4). Then the relevant regions would be deemed as tending to integration while they
are, in fact, either integrated or non-integrated without a trend towards integration.
At last, there are 15, or 20% of the total, non-integrated regions having no trend to integration with
the national market. While using model (6) augmented for the constant term, the unit root is not
rejected only in three of these time series, namely, in those for the Republic of Sakha, Magadan
Oblast, and Sakhalin Oblast. (However, the structural break was not taken into account in such
estimations.) This suggests that the reason of non-integration is, for the most part, a constant
nonzero difference of prices in a relevant region from the average Russian price rather than
deterministic or stochastic price divergence. However, as discussed in Section 2.1, the existence of
such a difference is taken as an indication of non-integration, since there is no way – in the context
of the current analysis – to part irremovable price differences from removable ones caused by
transitory impediments to integration.
Overall, the 1998 crisis strongly affected across-region price dynamics. Nevertheless, the behavior
of prices remained intact in a number of regions; the break is rejected for 23 regions (31% of all the
75). In these regions, the crisis caused a price spike, after which relative prices returned to the
previous trajectory.
The spatial pattern of market integration is presented in Figure 1. From this figure, about a half of
non-integrated regions are seen to concentrate in Central Russia. (In particular, non-integrated are
all but one regions of the Volga-Vyatka Territory.) The pattern is rather surprising, as these are
small regions with relatively short distances between them; besides that, this part of the country has
developed transport infrastructure. It can be surmised that it is the atomistic administrative-
territorial division of Central Russia that causes market segmentation: the more regional borders
and governors, the more possibilities to impede inter-regional trade and to diversify price policy
across space. Curiously, the Ulyanovsk Oblast which maintained price regulations and subsidizing
as long as up to the beginning of 2001 turns out to be tending to integration with the national
market. The time series of Moscow prices has an “almost confident” unit root with its λ = –0.003.
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 24
No correlation was found between non-integration and belonging to the “Red Belt” reported by
Berkowitz and DeJong (1999), even in the European part of Russia.
On the other hand, non-integrated regions are few in number in Siberia and the Far East. This
corroborates a finding by Gluschenko (2003) that the Asian part of Russia excluding difficult-to-
access regions is more integrated than European Russia. Another evidence seen in Figure 1 is the
fact that all difficult-to-access regions (the Murmansk, Magadan, Sakhalin, and Kamchatka oblasts,
and the Republic of Yakutia) are not integrated with the national market, a result that could be
expected. It also supports findings by Gluschenko (2002a, 2003) that these regions markedly
contribute to the overall disconnectedness of regional markets.
Turning to Appendix B containing the full set of estimates, the unit root in (6) or/and (6*) is rejected
for 20 regions recognized as tending to integration. Thus, if the traditional approach to the time
series analysis of integration were used, 47 regions, or 63%, would be classed as integrated with the
national market, and 28 regions (37%) would fall into non-integrated ones.
Among the estimates of Model (4) in Table B1, there are 13 non-subsiding trends (δ > 0) implying
divergence of prices, of which 10 have statistically insignificant δ, and two have insignificant factor
γ. The only significant non-subsiding trend has Moscow. Taking account of the structural break (see
Table B2), the number of positive estimates of δ increases to 20 in Model (4*), seven of them being
for the same regions as in (4). Of these 20, 13 are insignificant, two are accompanied with non-
rejection of the unit root in the model, and one is with insignificant factor γ + γB. This time, δ for
Moscow turns out insignificant, but instead, there are four significant non-subsiding trends for other
regions. For two of relevant regions, the unit root is rejected in (6*), and then only two cases of
price divergence remain. This pattern gives grounds to believe that the trend to convergence of
prices is predominant in the Russian market.
The pattern of spatial linkages of regions presented in Table 2 supports this belief. The table
summarizes results of Granger causality tests for 2775 region pairs, using 6 lags; see (7) in Section
2.1. The second column of the table is the percentage proportion of regions in which prices are
Granger caused by prices in the region named in a given row, >−rN ; similarly, the third column is
the proportion of regions that cause prices in a given one, 
−<rN ; the forth column is >−<rN , the
proportion of regions that both cause the given region and are caused by it; and the last but one
column is >−<−<>− −+= rrrr NNNN , describing the total extent of region’s price linkages with the
rest of the country. The last column reports p-values of the hypothesis that region’s spatial lag does
not Granger cause prices in the region; the number of neighboring regions in the lag is in
parenthesis; the p-values exceeding the 10-percent significance level are marked with bold italics.
While analyzing Granger causality, it was experimented with different number of lags, namely,
taking l = 3, 6, and 12 in (7). By and large, the results for these lags proved to be similar, having no
sufficient qualitative differences. (Appendix C reports a comparison of results obtained with
different number of lags.) On this basis, the results for 6 lags are taken as a basic stuff, having long
enough sequence of lags with reasonably small loss in the degrees of freedom.
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Thick lines are borders of economic territories, Roman numerals labelling the territories:
I    Northern Territory
II   Northwestern Territory
III  Central Territory
IV Volga-Vyatka Territory
V Central Black-Earth Territory
VI Volga Region Territory
For numerical designations of regions, see Table
VII   North-Caucasian Territory
VIII Ural Territory
IX    Western-Siberian Territory
X   Eastern-Siberian Territory
XI  Far-Eastern Territory
  Regions integrated with the national market   Out of sample  Non-integrated regions  Regions tending to integration
Fig. 1. Geographical pattern of market integration
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Table 2 evidences that the extent of inter-regional interaction is high: on average, price disturbances
are transmitted between a region and 46 other regions (or 62% of their total number). This figure
varies across regions from 26 regions (35%) to 65 regions (88%). The stable across tried lags group
of regions having rather weak price linkages with the rest of the country includes the Irkutsk and
Vladimir oblasts. Such a group for the strongest linkages includes the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia),
and  Saratov and Orenburg oblasts.
The range of >−rN  is 8 regions to 47 regions. The low-end group consists of the Republic of Tuva
and Irkutsk Oblast; and the Krasnodar and Khabarovsk krais are in the high-end group. The value
of 
−<rN  varies from 7 regions to 58 regions with Moscow stably entering into the low-end group.
The high-end group is not stable enough across different numbers of lags; however, the Republic of
Yakutia is close to belong to it. The number of bi-directional linkages, >−<rN , varies between 1
region and 32 regions, with the Irkutsk Oblast, Moscow, and Republic of Buryatia as the low-end
group, and the Belgorod Oblast as the high-end one.
Surprisingly, the extent of price linkages does not depend on whether regions are integrated with the
national market, or are tending to integration, or are not integrated. The averages over each of these
three region groups are close to those over all regions: the group averages of >−rN  fall in the range
31.2% to 36.2%; those of 
−<rN  have the range 37.5% to 41.5%; the range is 15.7% to 16.8% for
>−<rN ; and the group averages of the total index, Nr, lie in the range 60.2% to 62.3%. One more
surprising thing is the high extent of price linkages of the difficult-to-access regions. Their Nr
equals 50.0% to 87.8%, the Republic of Yakutia having the maximum value of it across all Russian
regions.
Table 2. Results of Granger causality tests
Region r
Percentage of
regions Granger
caused by r
Percentage of
regions Granger
causing r
Percentage of
bi-directional
causality
Total
P-value of spatial
Granger causality test
(“r–1” causes r)
  1. Rep. of Karelia 24.3 17.6 4.1 37.8 0.545 (2)
  2. Rep. of Komi 52.7 48.6 25.7 75.7 0.026 (1)
  3. Arkhangelsk Obl. 28.4 50.0 16.2 62.2 0.103 (2)
  4. Vologda Obl. 24.3 45.9 14.9 55.4 0.058 (4)
  5. Murmansk Obl. 41.9 52.7 17.6 77.0 0.076 (1)
  6. Saint Petersburg City 23.0 17.6 2.7 37.8 0.603 (5)
  7. Novgorod Obl. 31.1 33.8 10.8 54.1 0.037 (3)
  8. Pskov Obl. 16.2 31.1 5.4 41.9 0.971 (3)
  9. Kaliningrad Obl. 20.3 20.3 1.4 39.2 0.719 (1)
10. Bryansk Obl. 25.7 24.3 8.1 41.9 0.021 (4)
11. Vladimir Obl. 27.0 16.2 8.1 35.1 0.417 (4)
12. Ivanovo Obl. 36.5 18.9 8.1 47.3 0.302 (4)
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Region r
Percentage of
regions Granger
caused by r
Percentage of
regions Granger
causing r
Percentage of
bi-directional
causality
Total
P-value of spatial
Granger causality test
(“r–1” causes r)
13. Kaluga Obl. 40.5 45.9 17.6 68.9 0.851 (4)
14. Kostroma Obl. 33.8 45.9 16.2 63.5 0.109 (4)
15. Moscow City 29.7 12.2 5.4 36.5 0.795 (7)
16. Oryol Obl. 47.3 37.8 23.0 62.2 0.002 (4)
17. Ryazan Obl. 33.8 18.9 6.8 45.9 0.862 (7)
18. Smolensk Obl. 56.8 50.0 31.1 75.7 0.001 (4)
19. Tver Obl. 41.9 44.6 20.3 66.2 0.001 (4)
20. Tula Obl. 35.1 45.9 21.6 59.5 0.117 (5)
21. Yaroslavl Obl. 29.7 9.5 2.7 36.5 0.851 (4)
22. Rep. of Mariy El 45.9 47.3 17.6 75.7 0.003 (3)
23. Rep. of Mordovia 35.1 41.9 18.9 58.1 0.003 (5)
24. Chuvash Rep. 36.5 55.4 18.9 73.0 0.014 (5)
25. Kirov Obl. 41.9 20.3 10.8 51.4 0.616 (7)
26. Nizhni Novgorod Obl. 45.9 43.2 17.6 71.6 0.083 (5)
27. Belgorod Obl. 62.2 62.2 43.2 81.1 0.444 (1)
28. Voronezh Obl. 33.8 18.9 5.4 47.3 0.514 (6)
29. Kursk Obl. 62.2 31.1 18.9 74.3 0.518 (5)
30. Lipetsk Obl. 37.8 29.7 6.8 60.8 0.292 (6)
31. Tambov Obl. 35.1 47.3 21.6 60.8 0.015 (5)
32. Rep. of Kalmykia 35.1 24.3 2.7 56.8 0.172 (3)
33. Rep. of Tatarstan 54.1 43.2 20.3 77.0 0.376 (6)
34. Astrakhan Obl. 58.1 28.4 17.6 68.9 0.597 (3)
35. Volgograd Obl. 54.1 39.2 24.3 68.9 0.311 (5)
36. Penza Obl. 44.6 37.8 17.6 64.9 0.057 (5)
37. Samara Obl. 39.2 37.8 8.1 68.9 0.200 (4)
38. Saratov Obl. 48.6 68.9 29.7 87.8 0.007 (6)
39. Ulyanovsk Obl. 40.5 31.1 9.5 62.2 0.033 (6)
40. Rep. of Adygeya 31.1 12.2 5.4 37.8 0.050 (1)
41. Rep. of Dagestan 45.9 50.0 23.0 73.0 0.019 (2)
42. Kabardian-Balkar Rep. 33.8 40.5 17.6 56.8 0.352 (3)
43. Karachaev-Cirkassian
      Rep. 36.5 37.8 12.2 62.2 0.132 (3)
44. Rep. of Northern Ossetia 47.3 44.6 24.3 67.6 0.021 (2)
45. Krasnodar Krai 63.5 27.0 17.6 73.0 0.914 (4)
46. Stavropol Krai 37.8 40.5 13.5 64.9 0.192 (7)
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Region r
Percentage of
regions Granger
caused by r
Percentage of
regions Granger
causing r
Percentage of
bi-directional
causality
Total
P-value of spatial
Granger causality test
(“r–1” causes r)
47. Rostov Obl. 41.9 39.2 17.6 63.5 0.063 (4)
48. Rep. of Bashkortostan  48.6 44.6 18.9 74.3 0.739 (4)
49. Udmurt Rep. 37.8 31.1 9.5 59.5 0.337 (3)
50. Kurgan Obl. 29.7 59.5 21.6 67.6 0.535 (3)
51. Orenburg Obl. 44.6 73.0 35.1 82.4 0.240 (3)
52. Perm Obl. 20.3 31.1 6.8 44.6 0.201 (3)
53. Sverdlovsk Obl. 25.7 36.5 14.9 47.3 0.211 (5)
54. Chelyabinsk Obl. 47.3 52.7 23.0 77.0 0.302 (4)
55. Rep. of Altai 47.3 62.2 31.1 78.4 0.172 (1)
56. Altai Krai 48.6 36.5 17.6 67.6 0.052 (3)
57. Kemerovo Obl. 43.2 52.7 20.3 75.7 0.062 (5)
58. Novosibirsk Obl. 47.3 43.2 17.6 73.0 0.560 (4)
59. Omsk Obl. 29.7 41.9 8.1 63.5 0.605 (2)
60. Tomsk Obl. 29.7 23.0 8.1 44.6 0.806 (3)
61. Tyumen Obl. 43.2 52.7 24.3 71.6 0.005 (3)
62. Rep. of Buryatia 28.4 13.5 2.7 39.2 0.551 (2)
63. Rep. of Tuva 10.8 39.2 5.4 44.6 0.232 (2)
64. Rep. of Khakasia 45.9 58.1 32.4 71.6 0.202 (3)
65. Krasnoyarsk Krai 35.1 62.2 27.0 70.3 0.098 (5)
66. Irkutsk Obl. 12.2 27.0 1.4 37.8 0.633 (3)
67. Chita Obl. 32.4 48.6 20.3 60.8 0.002 (2)
68. Rep. of Sakha (Yakutia) 40.5 78.4 31.1 87.8 0.085 (1)
69. Jewish Autonomous Obl. 41.9 29.7 9.5 62.2 0.123 (2)
70. Primorsky Krai 47.3 14.9 6.8 55.4 0.522 (3)
71. Khabarovsk Krai 60.8 37.8 28.4 70.3 0.033 (4)
72. Amur Obl. 48.6 44.6 23.0 70.3 0.119 (3)
73. Kamchatka Obl. 14.9 41.9 6.8 50.0 0.537 (1)
74. Magadan Obl. 51.4 36.5 23.0 64.9 0.110 (1)
75. Sakhalin Obl. 58.1 59.5 33.8 83.8 0.002 (1)
Minimum 10.8 9.5 1.4 35.1
Maximum 63.5 78.4 43.2 87.8
Average 38.9 38.9 16.2 61.7
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 29
Matrix CR–1 has no one zero element, suggesting that there are no isolated regions or clusters of
regions. Eventually, each region is linked with all others either directly or through some chains of
regions. (In fact, three exponentiations have sufficed for the matrix to have no zero elements; hence,
each region is linked with any other one through no more that two regions.) This may be considered
as an indirect evidence of the absence of price convergence clubs.
Constructing spatial lags, P′“r-1”, to analyze spatial Granger causality, the actual transport
communication between regions is taken into account rather than their physical contiguity. For
example, the Kaliningrad Oblast, being an exclave, shares common border with no other region of
Russia (Saint Petersburg is deemed as its “trade neighbor”). Another example is the Kamchatka and
Magadan oblasts having a common border, but having no trade through it (for the both, the
Primorski Krai is taken as their “trade neighbor”, since delivery of goods to these regions comes
through Vladivostok, the capital of the Primorski Krai).
The last column of Table 2 suggests widespread spatial autocorrelation: a little less than two thirds
of regions (namely, 46 ones) are Granger caused by their spatial lags at the 10-percent level. There
are a number of interesting cases of the absence of it. Spatial autocorrelation is strongly rejected for
Moscow. This conforms with low value of its 
−<rN , evidencing that the Moscow prices are hardly
influences by prices in other regions. (On the other hand, the impact of Moscow prices on other
regions’ prices is not too strong; its >−rN  is well below the average.) The same, although a bit
weaker, is valid for Saint Petersburg. Prices in the Kamchatka and Magadan oblasts are not caused
by those in the Primorski Krai, their only “trade neighbor”, while being rather sufficiently caused
by prices in different regions. A possible explanation is that the Primorski Krai is – for the most part
– a trans-shipment point for delivery of goods to these regions, and not a region of origin of the
goods. The pattern is different for the rest three difficult-to-access regions (the Republic of Yakutia,
Sakhalin and Murmansk oblasts) that have only one “trade neighbor” as well: spatial
autocorrelation is accepted for them.
3.2. Price distribution dynamics
Having considered the state of market integration in 1994-2000, the evolution of integration during
this period is turned to. The first issue is that of σ-convergence. Figure 2 plots the dynamics of price
dispersion measured as σt, the standard deviation of prices normalized to the Russian average. The
trajectory of σt demonstrates that price dispersion over all regions has been almost permanently
decreasing, at least till the middle of 1999. This is a clear evidence of σ-convergence in 1994-2000,
suggesting that the Russian market is moving towards integration.
Additional trajectories for region groups provide insight into the structure of changes in price
dispersion. For comparability, standard deviations for region groups are computed with the use of the
mean over all regions rather than that over a given group, i.e., price dispersion is measured relative
whole of country; hence, it is not a within-group dispersion. With this, price dispersion over all
Russian regions is a weighted average of group dispersions, σt = (R1/R)σt1 + (R2/R)σt2 + (R3/R)σt3, the
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weight being the share of the group in the total number of regions (σti denotes standard deviation of
prices in region group i). The share of integrated regions is 0.36, that of non-integrated regions is 0.20,
and that of regions tending to integration is 0.44.
Fig. 2. Standard deviations of the log relative cost of the 25-food basket
The structural break caused by the August 1998 financial crisis is pronounced on the trajectories of
σ. Its evident effect is reducing price dispersion. As expected, the main contribution to the decrease
of price dispersion is due to regions tending to integration. Starting with σ roughly equaling the
country one in the beginning of the period, the gap between them quickly widens over time. For
integrated regions, price dispersion is the lowest and is near-constant, fluctuating around the level of
0.11 before the break, and around the level of 0.07 since January 1999.
The most price dispersion is inherent in non-integrated regions. The trajectory for this group has the
most pronounced structural break reducing the group σ by about a quarter. However, the main
contribution to this is due to difficult-to-access regions. Being computed for non-integrated regions
excluding difficult-to-access ones, the trajectory of σ appears to have no break. Contrary to the
theoretical expectations this subgroup does not exhibit increasing price dispersion. The reason is the
fact that there is almost no price divergence in the Russian market (indeed, the estimation results in
Appendix B provide only two clear evidences of price divergence). Regions deemed as non-
integrated are for the most part those having a persistent difference from the average Russian price,
as mentioned in Section 3.1.
To gain further insight into behavior of prices, dynamics of the entire cross-section distribution of
regional prices is to be considered. At first, the issue of interest is the degree to which the shape of
the price distribution changed over time. To assess these changes, probability densities have been
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non-parametrically estimated using Formula (8) for each year from 1994 through 2000. The
estimated densities are reported in Figure 3 for selected years. The distributions have been
estimated using cross sections averaged over each year in order to smooth accidental changes
occurring in instantaneous distributions. Appendix D reports results for all years in comparison with
instantaneous distributions for January 1994 and each December of 1994 through 2000.
(a) All regions (b) Non-integrated regions
(d) Integrated regions(c) Regions tending to integration
i
Fig. 3. Selected estimates of the price distributions
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The densities in the figure reveal several features in the distribution shape dynamics over the 7-year
period of 1994 to 2000. Turning to the sample of all regions, Figure 3a, the “main” mode of the
distribution is shifting from negative P to zero, or, in terms of prices, from the cost of the 25-food
basket below the Russian average to the national average. Along with this, the left-hand tail of the
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distribution shortens with time. But the long right-hand tail is persistent during the entire period,
and prevents the distribution from becoming symmetric by the end of the period. Likewise, a small
secondary mode in this tail is persistent. However, the right-hand tail somehow shortened, the high-
price mode shifting towards zero. Referring to Figure D1 in Appendix D, it is seen that the most
prominent shift occurs between 1997 and 1998, which can be assigned to the 1998 financial crisis.
For the most part, prices generating the high-price mode are those in the difficult-to-access and a
few more Far-Eastern regions. The share of foods imported from abroad was smaller in this part of
the country (as well as in the Asian part a Russia at all) than in its Western part. Therefore the sharp
devaluation of ruble in August 1998 lowered (relative) prices in most of the “high-price mode
regions”. It is in this way that the 1998 crisis narrowed the price gap between the Far East and the
rest of Russia.
As the group of non-integrated regions contains all difficult-to-access regions, it demonstrates
similar properties as regarding the right-hand tail (Figure 3b). There are two main differences from
the entire-country distribution. Firstly, the main mode does not shift with time, having the peak at
almost the same value of P. Secondly, the right-hand tail of the distributions is much heavier. It
comes as no surprise, as it is non-integrated “expensive” regions that concentrate in this tail. The
distribution for non-integrated regions has the following statistics in 2000 as compared to those for
Russia as a whole (in parentheses): the mean: 0.104 (–0.009), the median: –0.100 (–0.042), the
standard deviation: 0.281 (0.157).
The main mode of the distribution of regions tending to integration (Figure 3c) sufficiently shifts to
higher prices over time. This distribution has a small secondary mode in the area of prices above the
national average; this mode did not vanish after 1998. The distribution has the following statistics in
2000: the mean: –0.050, the median: –0.076, the standard deviation: 0.111.
At last, a few words about the distribution for integrated regions (Figure 3d). It tends towards a
symmetric one; its mean and median are close to one another and to zero: they are –0.023 and –
0.032, respectively, in 2000. The distribution is much narrower than that for Russia as a whole; the
standard deviation of the former equals 0.055 (while that of the latter is equal to 0.157). Besides
that, the distribution for integrated regions tends to normality. For example, the hypothesis of
normality has significance of 64% (by the Jarque-Bera statistic) in 2000.
Overall, it can be concluded that the distribution of prices in regions tending to integration has a
tendency of coming closer to the distribution of integrated regions (both in shape and position), so
corroborating their classification through the time series analysis. However, the distribution for non-
integrated regions almost does not change over time, except for its right-hand tail. (The reason for
the change in the tail was the 1998 crisis). Because of this, the distribution for entire Russia has the
long right-hand tail as well; the distribution remains to be bimodal with the secondary mode (yet,
very low) in this tail. Since the end of 1996, almost all of regions in the tail are remote ones except
for Moscow. In 1999 and 2000, the right part of the tail, where prices are more than 15% above the
national average, includes all difficult-to-access regions, the Khabarovsk Krai and the Primorsky
Krai (the almost easternmost regions of Russia), and Moscow. Their prices – at least, all of them –
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can be hardly believed to lower so that the right-hand tail becomes similar to the left-hand one.
Nevertheless, there are a number of regions which left this part of the tail during the period under
consideration. However, this is the subject of the next line of the analysis, namely, the analysis of
the intra-distribution mobility.
At first, the method proposed by Yitzhaki and Wodon (2001) is used; see Formulae (12) to (15) in
Section 2.1. Figure 4 compares dynamics of price inequality measured by the Gini coefficient, Gt,
and relative mobility measured by the Gini symmetric index of mobility, St. To control for effect of
the difficult-to-access regions’ peculiarity, Gt and St are computed for both entire Russia and
excluding difficult-to-access regions. However, as seen from the figure, this does not affect the
qualitative pattern. Price inequality is less in the latter case, and mobility is greater in quantitative
terms, but the behavior of both Gt and St is very close in these two cases. The asymmetric
(directional) mobility indices, Mt–1,t and Mt,t–1, turned out to be very close to St, for the most part
practically coinciding with it. For this reason, they are not plotted in Figure 4.
Fig. 4. Price inequality and relative mobility
It worth noting that the Gini coefficient is practically the same measure of price dispersion
(inequality) like the standard deviation of log prices, σt. Figure E1 in Appendix E provides a
comparison of σt from Figure 2 and Gt from Figure 4 (the both are over all regions). Being different
in values, these indicators have the same behavior over changes in distributions; their trajectories
coincide to a high degree of accuracy.
As Figure 4 suggests, relative mobility affects only on local properties of price inequality dynamics,
and does not have any pronounced effect on the global trend to the decrease of inequality. Spikes of
mobility correlate only with transitory rises in inequality. (Surprisingly, mobility does not act at all
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in favor of decrease of inequality.) Except these spikes, relative mobility remains to be very low,
not exceeding 0.015.
As for the spikes themselves, they occurs very regularly, having peaks, as a rule, in July – or near it
– of each year. They are thus seen to be a seasonal phenomenon. In summer, the rate of rise in
prices for many items covered by the 25-food basket (see Section 2.2) decreases dramatically, not
infrequently to negative values. However, this process is non-synchronous across regions of Russia,
depending on natural conditions in a given region and its agricultural specialization. As a
consequence, rather extensive changes in ranks of the cost of the food basket across regions happen,
and then the ranking returns to its original (or close to original) state within a few months. There are
two deviations from this regularity. In 1998, the summer spike was continued further (peaking in
September of that year) by the financial crisis. Inflation induced by the crisis turned out to be
chaotic across regions, as their delays in responding to the crisis were different. The same is valid
for December 1998, when a new burst of inflation occurred.
A possible reason for low relative mobility might be the fact that very short-run transitions are
considered. Usually, the distribution of prices changes gradually, and so, monthly changes could be
rather small, indicating law mobility. (An indirect indication of this slowness is the proximity of the
forward and reverse transition indices Mt–1,t and Mt,t–1 to one another, which means that the shape of
distributions ft–1(P) and ft(P) is rather similar.). At the same time, mobility over a longer period
could be sufficient. This inconsistency between mobility estimated over shorter and longer
transitions is a well-known problem discussed, e.g., by Singer and Spilerman (1976) with reference
to transition matrices.
To verify this, the relative-mobility indices are computed for longer time spans, one to six years.
The results are presented in Table 3. Cross sections averaged over each year are used; results for
Russia excluding difficult-to-access regions are in square brackets.
As can be expected, elimination of difficult-to-access regions decreases price inequality and
increases mobility. Nevertheless, mobility is very low, the mobility indices not exceeding 0.1 (the
maximum value is for the span of 1994-1999, equaling 0.95). The average of the one-year St is
0.027 (hereafter, the values for Russia excluding difficult-to-access regions are considered), and
that of the two-year one is 0.052. For longer transitions, the averages of the mobility index are very
close to one another (equaling 0.074 to 0.077), and to St for the 1994-2000 transition. It is clearly
seen that the financial crisis of 1998 has sufficiently contributed to the increase in mobility. In
general, the results in Table 3 give no clear indications, either, that there is any correlation between
relative mobility and the decrease of price inequality.
However, as Formula (16) states, the total change in inequality is due to interaction between relative
and absolute mobility. In Table 4, a change in the Gini coefficient is confronted with the Gini
correlation coefficient, Γt,t–τ, characterizing relative mobility, and parameter β*t–τ,t, characterizing
absolute mobility (lesser values of them correspond to greater mobility). The yearly averaged cross
sections without difficult-to-access regions are used for calculations; β*t–τ,t are computed by
Formula (16) rather than estimated through a Gini regression.
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Table 3. Mobility over different time horizons
Initial and final state Gini coefficient Gini mobility indices
t – τ t Gt–τ Gt Mt–τ,t Mt,t–τ St
1994 1995 0.152 [0.108] 0.128 [0.098] 0.014 [0.022] 0.016 [0.024] 0.015 [0.023]
1995 1996 0.128 [0.098] 0.127 [0.088] 0.017 [0.026] 0.014 [0.023] 0.016 [0.025]
1996 1997 0.127 [0.088] 0.114 [0.077] 0.019 [0.032] 0.016 [0.028] 0.018 [0.030]
1997 1998 0.114 [0.077] 0.105 [0.072] 0.015 [0.025] 0.015 [0.025] 0.015 [0.025]
1998 1999 0.105 [0.072] 0.078 [0.056] 0.020 [0.034] 0.021 [0.034] 0.020 [0.034]
1999 2000 0.078 [0.056] 0.084 [0.059] 0.014 [0.023] 0.016 [0.024] 0.015 [0.024]
1994 1996 0.152 [0.108] 0.127 [0.088] 0.025 [0.034] 0.022 [0.034] 0.023 [0.036]
1994 1997 0.152 [0.108] 0.114 [0.077] 0.052 [0.083] 0.041 [0.069] 0.047 [0.077]
1994 1998 0.152 [0.108] 0.105 [0.072] 0.047 [0.077] 0.047 [0.080] 0.047 [0.078]
1994 1999 0.152 [0.108] 0.078 [0.056] 0.057 [0.092] 0.063 [0.101] 0.059 [0.095]
1994 2000 0.152 [0.108] 0.084 [0.059] 0.046 [0.076] 0.048 [0.078] 0.047 [0.077]
1995 1997 0.128 [0.098] 0.114 [0.077] 0.041 [0.063] 0.032 [0.055] 0.037 [0.059]
1995 1998 0.128 [0.098] 0.105 [0.072] 0.035 [0.053] 0.036 [0.061] 0.035 [0.057]
1995 1999 0.128 [0.098] 0.078 [0.056] 0.050 [0.076] 0.052 [0.084] 0.050 [0.079]
1995 2000 0.128 [0.098] 0.084 [0.059] 0.038 [0.058] 0.036 [0.059] 0.037 [0.059]
1996 1998 0.127 [0.088] 0.105 [0.072] 0.028 [0.046] 0.031 [0.052] 0.029 [0.049]
1996 1999 0.127 [0.088] 0.078 [0.056] 0.047 [0.079] 0.054 [0.087] 0.049 [0.082]
1996 2000 0.127 [0.088] 0.084 [0.059] 0.042 [0.070] 0.048 [0.077] 0.044 [0.073]
1997 1999 0.114 [0.077] 0.078 [0.056] 0.043 [0.075] 0.046 [0.074] 0.044 [0.075]
1997 2000 0.114 [0.077] 0.084 [0.059] 0.046 [0.080] 0.052 [0.084] 0.049 [0.082]
1998 2000 0.105 [0.072] 0.084 [0.059] 0.025 [0.042] 0.026 [0.042] 0.029 [0.042]
Table 4. Interaction between relative and absolute mobility
Initial and final state
t – τ t
Gt/Gt–τ Γt,t–τ β*t–τ,t
1994 1995 0.903 0.952 0.869
1995 1996 0.897 0.954 0.857
1996 1997 0.877 0.944 0.836
1997 1998 0.927 0.950 0.877
1998 1999 0.779 0.932 0.726
1999 2000 1.063 0.951 1.010
1994 2000 0.545 0.845 0.468
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The results in the table suggest that absolute mobility prevails over relative mobility (as β*t–τ,t < Γt,t–τ),
so causing price dispersion – hence, the variance of the price distribution – to decrease. The exception
is the transition from 1999 to 2000, where β*t–τ,t indicates (slight) divergence of prices, being more
than unity. As the result, price inequality slightly rises in 2000 as compared to 1999. The most
pronounced pattern is provided by the transition though the entire time span, from 1994 to 2000.
Here, the mobility indicators differ almost twice, thus almost halving price inequality over the time
span. The same pattern takes place for month-to-month transitions, but being, of course, much less
pronounced than for year-to-year ones. Figure E2 in Appendix E illustrates such a pattern with the use
of cross sections over all regions.
To gain the better insight into absolute mobility, the evolution of the entire across-region
distribution of prices is modeled by the stochastic kernel; see Formulae (17) through (19) in Section
2.1. From considerations of robustness of the results, the kernel is estimated in two ways. The first
uses information only on the price transition of regions from the beginning to the end of the time
span concerned. That is, the estimate of the stochastic kernel is )(ˆ)(ˆ 19942000 PPfPPf tt =τ− . The
second way makes use of information on the transitions within 1994-2000; the more distant is a
transition in time, the lesser importance is attached to it. That is, the estimate of the stochastic
kernel is a weighted average of the year-to-year estimates (a is a normalizing factor making the
weights to sum to unity): )1/)(ˆ...5/)(ˆ6/)(ˆ()(ˆ 199920001995199619941995 PPfPPfPPfaPPf tt +++=τ− .
The kernels are estimated using yearly averaged cross sections. Figure 5 reports the three-
dimensional plots of both estimates of the stochastic kernel. A line projected from a fixed Pt-τ,
parallel to the Pt axis, characterizes probability to transit to particular values of prices at t, given the
value of the price at t  – τ.
In spite of differences between the kernels obtained, they are qualitatively similar, suggesting
the same features of price distribution dynamics. The dashed lines in Figures 5a and 5b mark
the diagonals, i.e., the lines of equal prices at t – τ and t.  In other words, the diagonal is the
“line of immobility”. Be a most of the probability mass concentrated along this line, it would
evidence low absolute price mobility. However, this is not the case; the pattern suggests that the
degree of mobility is rather high. The mode line of both stochastic kernels is turned counter-
clockwise, crossing the diagonal approximately at the zero point. This implies that regions with
prices below the Russian average tend to transit to higher prices, and those with high prices tend
to transit to lower prices; only regions with prices close to the national average are near-
immobile.
As described in Section 2.1, the stochastic kernel can be used for estimating a long-run limit of the
price distribution, the ergodic distribution. Figure 6 presents estimates of ergodic distributions
obtained with the use of both kernels; the actual price distribution for 2000 is reported for
comparison.
While estimating the ergodic distribution, 23 iterations (exponentiations) according Formulae (20)
and (21) have been sufficient for kernel (a) to converge to it, and 89 iterations have been needed for
kernel (b). Two estimated distributions are close to each other. They are almost symmetric except
for long right-hand tail which shortens but still persists. The distribution is unimodal, thus
suggesting the absence of price convergence clubs in the long run.
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(b) Estimated with the use of year-to-year transitions
Fig. 5. Relative price dynamics across Russian regions: the estimated stochastic kernels
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Fig. 6. Ergodic distributions of regional prices
4. CONCLUSIONS
Using the cost of the basket of 25 basic food goods as the price representative, the spatial pattern
and trends of market integration in Russia in 1994-2000 have been analyzed. The results obtained
evidence poor market integration: with the strict law of one price as the benchmark, only about one
third of Russian regions can be deemed as integrated with the national market. Nevertheless,
encouraging evidence is found of trends towards more integration. About a half of Russian regions
are classed with those tending to integration. Besides that, it is inconceivable that the obtained
pattern of integration overstates shortcomings of the Russian market, ignoring such an irremovable
market friction as spatial separation of regions.
Overall, the results unambiguously suggest that the Russian market has been moving towards
integration. (An exception is the group of the difficult-to-access regions, which is hardly
involved in this movement. However, the difficult access is one more irremovable market
friction; Non-integration of these regions owes to geographical features of the country rather
than to some economic policy, either national or regional.) More exactly, it moved until about
the end of 1999. Then why it stopped? It seems that by that time price convergence in Russia
completed, having reached a “natural” limit of market integration. This is corroborated by the
fact that the ergodic distributions of prices are close to the actual distribution in 2000 (see
Figure 6).
 Reasoning from the theoretical benchmark of complete integration, the situation is not brilliant, as
one fifth of regions neither are integrated nor tend to become such. But let us compare it with an
actual benchmark: the United States, whose market is deemed to be the most integrated.  Figure 7
provides such a comparison.
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Fig. 7. Price dispersion across Russia and the US
In this figure, the data on the 25-item basket are supplemented with the data on a new, 33-item
basket, introduced since June 2000; the source of the data is Goskomstat (2000-2003). The costs of
the baskets are normalized to the cost for Russia as a whole. Judging from the second half of 2000,
for which there are data on both baskets are available, standard deviations of their costs, calculated
across Russia without difficult-to-access regions, are close to one another. ACCRA (1994-2002)
data on the relative (to the US average) costs of the 27-item grocery basket across about 300 US
cities with quarterly frequency are used as a US price representative (see the source for composition
of the basket).
Firstly, the figure confirms the conclusion that price convergence in Russia is near to be completed:
in recent years, price dispersion remains rather stable, fluctuating about the level of 0.1. And
secondly – what is the most important thing – price dispersion across Russia in the last years is
comparable with that across US.
This finding corroborates Shleifer and Treisman (2003) who conclude that by the late 1990s Russia
has become a typical middle-income capitalist country. (As they write, “Russia’s economic and
political systems remain far from perfect. However, their defects are typical of countries at its level
of economic development”.) Moreover, regarding market integration, the behavior of the
contemporary Russian economy is not far from that of the US economy.
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APPENDICES
A. Unit root test statistics for models with nonlinear trend and/or break
To obtain p-values of the t-ratio of λ that is used in the unit root test for Equation (4), the equation
has been estimated over each of 500,000 simulated random walks having T = 84 observations, thus
obtaining the empirical distribution of this t-ratio (referred to as τNL). Denoting the number of trial
as i, observations are generated as )( )2(
)(
)2(
i
T
i
TP −−−− ε= , and
)()(
1
)( i
t
i
t
i
t PP ε+= −  for t = –(T – 3),…,T, where
)(i
tε is a random number such that 
)(i
tε ∼ N(0,1). Discarding observations with t ≤ 0 (to avoid initial
value bias), a simulated random-walk series {Pt(i)}t=1,…,T  is obtained.
For comparison, the t-ratios of λ in conventional autoregressions with no constant term, with
constant, with constant and trend, and with constant, trend and trend squared (τ0, τc, τct, and τctt
statistic, respectively) have been estimated over the same series. These regressions are
∆Pt = λPt–1 + εt, (A1)
∆Pt = α + λPt–1 + εt, (A2)
∆Pt = α + λPt–1 + βt + εt, (A3)
∆Pt = α + λPt–1 + β1t + β2t2 + εt. (A4)
Nonlinear least squares used for estimating Equation (4) finds a local minimum of the sum of
squared residuals (SSR). To make this problem milder, the equation has been estimated with the use
of three sets of initial values of coefficients. The first is simply { 0,0,0 000 =δ=γ=λ }. The second
set is { aaa δ=δγ=γλ=λ ˆ,ˆ,ˆ 000 }, where aγˆ  and aδˆ  are the estimates of γ and δ in auxiliary
equation Pt = ln(1 + γeδt) + πt, and aλˆ  is the estimate of λ in ttt ε+πλ=π∆ −1ˆˆ , tπˆ being the estimated
residuals in the previous regression. The third set is { ,1)ˆ/ˆexp(,ˆ 00 −λα−=γλ=λ ccc  00 =δ },
where cλˆ  and cαˆ  are the estimates of γ and α in (A2); that is, (4) is initially set to be equivalent to
(A2). With the three estimation results for (4) over a given series, the one with minimum SSR is
chosen as “true”, calculating t-ratio )ˆ(/ˆ)(NL λσλ=τ i , where σ denotes the standard error of the
estimate.
Having obtained t-ratios for (4) and (A1) through (A4) over all trials, their numerical distributions
are constructed. Table A1 reports some critical values of these estimated statistics; MacKinnon’s
(1996) values for the sample size of 83 are in square brackets.
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Table A1. Critical values of the unit root test τ-statistics
Significance level τNL τ0 τc τct τctt
0.1% -4.8200 -3.3843 -4.2626 -4.8159 -5.2774
[-3.3633] [-4.2508] [-4.8080] [-5.2576]
1% -3.9634 -2.6015 -3.5134 -4.0684 -4.5160
[-2.5931] [-3.5113] [-4.0724] [-4.5164]
5% -3.3103 -1.9478 -2.8991 -3.4598 -3.9017
[-1.9448] [-2.8968] [-3.4649] [-3.9059]
10% -2.9776 -1.6163 -2.5856 -3.1575 -3.5954
[-1.6142] [-2.5856] [-3.1590] [-3.5983]
20% -2.5846 -1.2214 -2.2202 -2.8042 -3.2418
[-1.2276] [-2.2226] [-2.8044] [-3.2422]
The deviations of estimated critical values of τ0, τc, τct, and τctt statistics in the table from the
MacKinnon’s values fall into the band of [–0.5%, +0.6%]. This can be deemed as rather good
accuracy, providing reason to believe that the estimates for τNL are sufficiently accurate as well.
Figure A1 demonstrates the probability density of τNL and its cumulative distribution in comparison
with those of conventional τ-statistics, and Figure A2 plots the left-hand tails of the cumulative
distributions.
  
                                (a) Probability densities                                                      (b) Cumulative distributions
Fig. A1. Distributions of τ-statistics
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Fig. A2. Left-hand tails of cumulative distributions of τ-statistics
τ
τ0
τc
τctt
τNL
τct
As seen from the table and figures, a τ-test is – for the most part – more powerful in rejecting unit
root in the case of nonlinear trend of form (1) than in the case of linear trend (not to mention the
quadratic trend). Almost along the whole its length, the cumulative distribution of τNL lies between
τc and τct. However, at small p-values, lower than 0.002, it is τNL < τct. Nevertheless, τNL still
remains greater than τctt. Though, it is not inconceivable that the former becomes smaller than the
latter at very small p-values, lower than 0.00004; however, there are too few observations of τ-
statistics in this area for confident judgments. Interestingly, τNL becomes greater than τc at high p-
values exceeding 0.96.
Empirical distributions for the case of structural break in time series have been computed in the
similar way. The difference in simulated series is that, in each trial, a number of random walks with
breaks {Pt(i)(t*)}t=1,…,T are generated as )(*1
*
B
*)(
1
*)( ))()(()()( ittt
i
t
i
t tBtBtPtP ε+−γ+= −−  (t = 1,…,T),
where )(B
iP=γ , for t* = 1998:08, …, 1999:02. (Recall that Bt(t*) = 1 if t < t*, and zero otherwise)
Over each of these series, Equations (4*) and (6*) have been estimated, yielding a set of the t-ratios
of λ for various periods of structural break. Table A2 reports some critical values of these estimated
statistics, τNL(t*) and τ0(t*), and Figure A3 demonstrates the left-hand tails of the their cumulative
distributions. For comparison, selected τ-statistics from above are included.
As could be expected, the cumulative distributions of τ for the linear model with break lie between
those for the linear models without and with the constant term. With this, they are closer to τ0 than
to τc. The distributions for the model with nonlinear trend and break lie to the left of that for the
relevant model without break. They are rather close to the latter, and lie to the right of the
distribution for the model with linear trend, except for low p-values (0.015 and lesser). In both
cases, distributions for different break periods are very close to one another, and are hardly
distinguishable in the figure.
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Table A2. Critical values of the unit root test τ-statistics for models with structural break
Model with nonlinear tend (4*)
τNL(t*) with t* =Significance
Level
τNL
1998:08 1998:09 1998:10 1998:11 1998:12 1999:01 1999:02
τct
0.1% -4.8200 -4.8530 -4.8605 -4.8753 -4.8892 -4.8824 -4.8724 -4.8718 -4.8159
1% -3.9634 -4.0335 -4.0450 -4.0523 -4.0555 -4.0635 -4.0581 -4.0647 -4.0684
5% -3.3103 -3.3568 -3.3687 -3.3719 -3.3760 -3.3786 -3.3778 -3.3812 -3.4598
10% -2.9776 -3.0172 -3.0265 -3.0300 -3.0346 -3.0359 -3.0377 -3.0389 -3.1575
20% -2.5846 -2.6216 -2.6296 -2.6331 -2.6353 -2.6384 -2.6399 -2.6409 -2.8042
Linear model (6*)
τ0(t*) with t* =Significance
Level
τ0
1998:08 1998:09 1998:10 1998:11 1998:12 1999:01 1999:02
τc
0.1% -3.3843 -3.8372 -3.8519 -3.8549 -3.8593 -3.8665 -3.8703 -3.8719 -4.2626
1% -2.6015 -2.9746 -2.9805 -2.9854 -2.9876 -2.9918 -2.9987 -3.0044 -3.5134
5% -1.9478 -2.2323 -2.2351 -2.2389 -2.2438 -2.2456 -2.2498 -2.2551 -2.8991
10% -1.6163 -1.8746 -1.8767 -1.8782 -1.8811 -1.8806 -1.8836 -1.8865 -2.5856
20% -1.2214 -1.4798 -1.4808 -1.4804 -1.4811 -1.4822 -1.4822 -1.4831 -2.2202
Fig. A3. Left-hand tails of cumulative distributions of τ-statistics for models with break
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B. Results of estimations of time-series models
Table B1. Models without structural breaks
Model (4) Model (6)
Region
p(λ=0) λ γ δ p(λ=0) λ
  1. Rep. of Karelia 0.003 -0.423 (0.091) 0.186 (0.030)*** -0.0112 (0.0042)*** 0.082 -0.069 (0.036)
  2. Rep. of Komi 0.007 -0.345 (0.084) 0.281 (0.063)*** -0.0277 (0.0082)*** 0.139 -0.075 (0.041)
  3. Arkhangelsk Obl. 0.011 -0.376 (0.088) 0.343 (0.033)*** -0.0186 (0.0028)*** 0.145 -0.027 (0.020)
  4. Vologda Obl. 0.014 -0.330 (0.086) -0.057 (0.024)** -0.0140 (0.0115) 0.014 -0.157 (0.061)
  5. Murmansk Obl. 0.041 -0.221 (0.070) 0.426 (0.069)*** -0.0065 (0.0035)* 0.218 -0.018 (0.015)
  6. Saint Petersburg City 0.006 -0.376 (0.088) 0.002 (0.003) 0.0520 (0.0238)*** 0.008 -0.182 (0.066)
  7. Novgorod Obl. 0.000 -0.681 (0.107) -0.044 (0.016)*** -0.0185 (0.0121) 0.000 -0.469 (0.092)
  8. Pskov Obl. 0.007 -0.349 (0.084) -0.113 (0.021)*** -0.0062 (0.0044) 0.273 -0.055 (0.037)
  9. Kaliningrad Obl. 0.144 -0.180 (0.064) -0.089 (0.071) -0.0055 (0.0170) 0.038 -0.103 (0.046)
10. Bryansk Obl. 0.011 -0.339 (0.086) -0.216 (0.021)*** -0.0115 (0.0027)*** 0.105 -0.032 (0.021)
11. Vladimir Obl. 0.002 -0.406 (0.088) -0.151 (0.018)*** -0.0122 (0.0034)*** 0.306 -0.043 (0.032)
12. Ivanovo Obl. 0.016 -0.305 (0.080) -0.121 (0.025)*** -0.0120 (0.0056)** 0.122 -0.059 (0.036)
13. Kaluga Obl. 0.035 -0.239 (0.073) -0.236 (0.075)*** -0.0417 (0.0166)** 0.040 -0.076 (0.038)
14. Kostroma Obl. 0.041 -0.314 (0.083) -0.102 (0.020)*** -0.0003 (0.0039) 0.506 -0.032 (0.032)
15. Moscow City 0.064 -0.226 (0.070) 0.142 (0.027)*** 0.0091 (0.0033)*** 0.707 -0.003 (0.016)
16. Oryol Obl. 0.015 -0.328 (0.085) -0.313 (0.029)*** -0.0171 (0.0030)*** 0.072 -0.033 (0.021)
17. Ryazan Obl. 0.120 -0.152 (0.052) -0.244 (0.114)** -0.0317 (0.0151)** 0.197 -0.036 (0.030)
18. Smolensk Obl. 0.003 -0.393 (0.089) -0.253 (0.034)*** -0.0169 (0.0043)*** 0.064 -0.064 (0.035)
19. Tver Obl. 0.038 -0.248 (0.072) -0.116 (0.038)*** -0.0080 (0.0078) 0.041 -0.080 (0.037)
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Model (4) Model (6)
Region
p(λ=0) λ γ δ p(λ=0) λ
20. Tula Obl. 0.009 -0.276 (0.068) -0.246 (0.034)*** -0.0204 (0.0045)*** 0.291 -0.026 (0.024)
21. Yaroslavl Obl. 0.031 -0.278 (0.075) -0.122 (0.033)*** -0.0215 (0.0092)** 0.101 -0.078 (0.043)
22. Rep. of Mariy El 0.156 -0.180 (0.065) -0.200 (0.034)*** -0.0012 (0.0033) 0.330 -0.014 (0.015)
23. Rep. of Mordovia 0.019 -0.299 (0.082) -0.165 (0.023)*** 0.0027 (0.0025) 0.312 -0.022 (0.020)
24. Chuvash Rep. 0.013 -0.285 (0.075) -0.236 (0.019)*** -0.0058 (0.0019)*** 0.447 -0.010 (0.014)
25. Kirov Obl. 0.049 -0.242 (0.073) -0.135 (0.027)*** -0.0004 (0.0040)*** 0.340 -0.027 (0.024)
26. Nizhni Novgorod Obl. 0.011 -0.341 (0.084) -0.092 (0.019)*** 0.0006 (0.0040)*** 0.214 -0.050 (0.034)
27. Belgorod Obl. 0.000 -0.470 (0.095) -0.261 (0.027)*** -0.0119 (0.0030)*** 0.218 -0.054 (0.035)
28. Voronezh Obl. 0.001 -0.449 (0.094) -0.380 (0.024)*** -0.0250 (0.0027)*** 0.037 -0.041 (0.022)
29. Kursk Obl. 0.000 -0.471 (0.097) -0.245 (0.025)*** -0.0152 (0.0032)*** 0.058 -0.066 (0.033)
30. Lipetsk Obl. 0.003 -0.408 (0.091) -0.233 (0.018)*** -0.0090 (0.0020)*** 0.248 -0.026 (0.021)
31. Tambov Obl. 0.004 -0.325 (0.077) -0.264 (0.030)*** -0.0114 (0.0031)*** 0.309 -0.025 (0.024)
32. Rep. of Kalmykia 0.000 -0.550 (0.099) -0.188 (0.025)*** -0.0209 (0.0049)*** 0.052 -0.118 (0.051)
33. Rep. of Tatarstan 0.000 -0.577 (0.098) -0.267 (0.017)*** -0.0041 (0.0015)*** 0.098 -0.041 (0.025)
34. Astrakhan Obl. 0.000 -0.701 (0.106) -0.181 (0.020)*** -0.0250 (0.0045)*** 0.027 -0.150 (0.057)
35. Volgograd Obl. 0.001 -0.451 (0.093) -0.112 (0.022)*** -0.0077 (0.0048) 0.024 -0.116 (0.047)
36. Penza Obl. 0.026 -0.279 (0.078) -0.227 (0.027)*** -0.0099 (0.0031)*** 0.202 -0.026 (0.020)
37. Samara Obl. 0.001 -0.442 (0.092) 0.000 (0.001)*** 0.0746 (0.0705) 0.000 -0.376 (0.087)
38. Saratov Obl. 0.014 -0.316 (0.082) -0.178 (0.035)*** -0.0105 (0.0052)** 0.124 -0.064 (0.036)
39. Ulyanovsk Obl. 0.000 -0.428 (0.084) -0.416 (0.022)*** -0.0093 (0.0014)*** 0.018 -0.035 (0.017)
40. Rep. of Adygeya 0.000 -0.716 (0.107) -0.233 (0.014)*** -0.0134 (0.0018)*** 0.162 -0.058 (0.034)
41. Rep. of Dagestan 0.000 -0.574 (0.101) -0.122 (0.023)*** -0.0124 (0.0052)** 0.006 -0.178 (0.062)
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Model (4) Model (6)
Region
p(λ=0) λ γ δ p(λ=0) λ
42. Kabardian-Balkar Rep. 0.000 -0.231 (0.040) -0.828 (0.079)*** -0.0929 (0.0166)*** 0.081 -0.076 (0.043)
43. Karachaev-Cirkassian Rep. 0.011 -0.331 (0.084) -0.133 (0.034)*** -0.0054 (0.0058) 0.158 -0.080 (0.044)
44. Rep. of Northern Ossetia 0.002 -0.445 (0.093) -0.243 (0.032)*** -0.0252 (0.0053)*** 0.073 -0.082 (0.040)
45. Krasnodar Krai 0.001 -0.497 (0.097) -0.162 (0.026)*** -0.0088 (0.0040)** 0.078 -0.103 (0.047)
46. Stavropol Krai 0.000 -0.554 (0.100) -0.165 (0.016)*** -0.0091 (0.0025)*** 0.170 -0.060 (0.036)
47. Rostov Obl. 0.000 -0.679 (0.106) -0.185 (0.012)*** -0.0066 (0.0016)*** 0.181 -0.051 (0.032)
48. Rep. of Bashkortostan 0.006 -0.356 (0.085) -0.134 (0.029)*** -0.0048 (0.0049) 0.165 -0.074 (0.042)
49. Udmurt Rep. 0.011 -0.313 (0.081) -0.129 (0.027)*** -0.0054 (0.0047) 0.216 -0.052 (0.035)
50. Kurgan Obl. 0.004 -0.294 (0.066) -0.055 (0.022)** 0.0109 (0.0066) 0.023 -0.089 (0.039)
51. Orenburg Obl. 0.024 -0.291 (0.078) -0.062 (0.034)* 0.0088 (0.0092) 0.033 -0.116 (0.052)
52. Perm Obl. 0.003 -0.372 (0.082) 0.160 (0.074)** -0.0842 (0.0391)** 0.009 -0.204 (0.067)
53. Sverdlovsk Obl. 0.020 -0.292 (0.081) 0.119 (0.044)*** -0.0213 (0.0118)* 0.051 -0.108 (0.052)
54. Chelyabinsk Obl. 0.000 -0.721 (0.108) -0.007 (0.013) 0.0067 (0.0369) 0.000 -0.698 (0.105)
55. Rep. of Altai 0.003 -0.428 (0.091) -0.005 (0.015) 0.0199 (0.0428) 0.000 -0.401 (0.088)
56. Altai Krai 0.067 -0.220 (0.069) -0.099 (0.034)*** 0.0028 (0.0063) 0.274 -0.042 (0.033)
57. Kemerovo Obl. 0.007 -0.307 (0.076) 0.071 (0.064) -0.0354 (0.0396) 0.000 -0.237 (0.058)
58. Novosibirsk Obl. 0.002 -0.348 (0.073) 0.022 (0.017) 0.0090 (0.0138) 0.000 -0.234 (0.059)
59. Omsk Obl. 0.012 -0.356 (0.086) -0.204 (0.031)*** -0.0211 (0.0054)*** 0.098 -0.065 (0.035)
60. Tomsk Obl. 0.001 -0.393 (0.086) -0.001 (0.002) 0.0581 (0.0338)* 0.000 -0.252 (0.071)
61. Tyumen Obl. 0.104 -0.185 (0.063) 0.209 (0.138) -0.0413 (0.0275) 0.061 -0.089 (0.046)
62. Rep. of Buryatia 0.090 -0.208 (0.068) 0.217 (0.094)** -0.0227 (0.0135)* 0.096 -0.073 (0.040)
63. Rep. of Tuva 0.020 -0.297 (0.079) 0.267 (0.050)*** -0.0074 (0.0042)* 0.359 -0.032 (0.027)
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Model (4) Model (6)
Region
p(λ=0) λ γ δ p(λ=0) λ
64. Rep. of Khakasia 0.008 -0.337 (0.081) 0.019 (0.014) 0.0170 (0.0114) 0.010 -0.157 (0.058)
65. Krasnoyarsk Krai 0.189 -0.173 (0.062) 0.036 (0.068) -0.0015 (0.0372) 0.014 -0.145 (0.055)
66. Irkutsk Obl. 0.027 -0.288 (0.079) 0.207 (0.087)** -0.0118 (0.0105) 0.044 -0.113 (0.050)
67. Chita Obl. 0.000 -0.448 (0.089) 0.432 (0.040)*** -0.0152 (0.0025)*** 0.347 -0.026 (0.023)
68. Rep. of Sakha (Yakutia) 0.093 -0.185 (0.061) 1.297 (0.245)*** -0.0086 (0.0039)** 0.513 -0.007 (0.013)
69. Jewish Autonomous Obl. 0.028 -0.271 (0.076) 0.362 (0.051)*** -0.0150 (0.0037)*** 0.080 -0.031 (0.019)
70. Primorsky Krai 0.040 -0.282 (0.081) 0.545 (0.060)*** -0.0076 (0.0025)*** 0.384 -0.012 (0.014)
71. Khabarovsk Krai 0.001 -0.442 (0.094) 0.485 (0.038)*** -0.0121 (0.0019)*** 0.247 -0.021 (0.018)
72. Amur Obl. 0.044 -0.246 (0.070) 0.282 (0.076)*** -0.0121 (0.0066)* 0.025 -0.061 (0.028)
73. Kamchatka Obl. 0.045 -0.251 (0.071) 1.103 (0.134)*** -0.0059 (0.0025)** 0.551 -0.006 (0.011)
74. Magadan Obl. 0.203 -0.136 (0.057) 1.403 (0.260)*** -0.0091 (0.0038)** 0.256 -0.009 (0.008)
75. Sakhalin Obl. 0.081 -0.187 (0.064) 1.147 (0.181)*** -0.0129 (0.0036)*** 0.337 -0.010 (0.012)
Table B2. Models with structural breaks
Model (4*) Model (6*)
Region
Break
period p(λ=0) λ γ Break (γB) δ p(λ=0) λ Break (γB)
  1. Rep. of Karelia 1998:09 0.366 -0.119 (0.053) 6.785 (10.218) -6.349 (9.947) -0.0585 (0.0274)** 0.190 -0.019 (0.013) -0.218 (0.036)***
  2. Rep. of Komi 1998:12 0.002 -0.439 (0.092) 0.005 (0.058) 0.227 (0.072)*** -0.0168 (0.0063)*** 0.001 -0.334 (0.084) 0.129 (0.017)***
  3. Arkhangelsk Obl. 1998:12 0.006 -0.428 (0.093) 0.195 (0.049)*** 0.119 (0.039)*** -0.0138 (0.0030)*** 0.283 -0.042 (0.028) 0.064 (0.032)**
  4. Vologda Obl. 1998:09 0.013 -0.360 (0.091) -0.015 (0.017) -0.032 (0.018)* -0.0022 (0.0123) 0.001 -0.347 (0.089) -0.043 (0.010)***
  5. Murmansk Obl. 1998:09 0.194 -0.162 (0.061) 1.448 (0.440)*** -0.852 (0.348)** -0.0217 (0.0054)*** 0.233 -0.013 (0.009) -0.207 (0.036)***
  6. Saint Petersburg City 1998:09 0.010 -0.355 (0.086) 2.701 (3.325) -2.657 (3.313) -0.0489 (0.0199)** 0.420 -0.028 (0.024) -0.183 (0.036)***
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Model (4*) Model (6*)
Region
Break
period p(λ=0) λ γ Break (γB) δ p(λ=0) λ Break (γB)
  7. Novgorod Obl. 1998:09 0.000 -0.674 (0.108) 0.002 (0.010) -0.036 (0.018)* -0.0003 (0.0125) 0.000 -0.677 (0.106) -0.034 (0.007)***
  8. Pskov Obl. 1998:09 0.006 -0.384 (0.089) -0.060 (0.024)** -0.039 (0.015)** 0.0005 (0.0054) 0.027 -0.181 (0.069) -0.088 (0.021)***
  9. Kaliningrad Obl. 1998:09 0.083 -0.208 (0.067) -0.005 (0.009) -0.047 (0.034) 0.0207 (0.0147) 0.017 -0.173 (0.063) -0.125 (0.030)***
10. Bryansk Obl. 1998:08 0.066 -0.274 (0.083) -0.385 (0.108)*** 0.147 (0.088)* -0.0176 (0.0045)*** 0.093 -0.022 (0.014) 0.098 (0.030)***
11. Vladimir Obl. 1998:09 0.008 -0.380 (0.091) -0.057 (0.021)*** -0.070 (0.017)*** -0.0029 (0.0043) 0.030 -0.175 (0.067) -0.122 (0.018)***
12. Ivanovo Obl. 1999:01 0.007 -0.382 (0.090) -0.045 (0.022)** -0.060 (0.019)*** -0.0044 (0.0051) 0.002 -0.301 (0.084) -0.090 (0.012)***
13. Kaluga Obl. 1998:09 0.453 -0.069 (0.036) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.2692 (0.2479) 0.053 -0.098 (0.049) -0.119 (0.028)***
14. Kostroma Obl. 1998:09 0.030 -0.333 (0.086) -0.045 (0.017)*** -0.035 (0.009)*** 0.0094 (0.0051)* 0.422 -0.078 (0.053) -0.090 (0.028)***
15. Moscow City 1998:08 0.030 -0.258 (0.072) 0.249 (0.060)*** -0.084 (0.041)** 0.0020 (0.0037) 0.788 -0.003 (0.013) -0.070 (0.028)**
16. Oryol Obl. 1998:08 0.008 -0.370 (0.089) -0.505 (0.124)*** 0.170 (0.106) -0.0216 (0.0036)*** 0.077 -0.027 (0.017) 0.061 (0.040)
17. Ryazan Obl. 1998:09 0.093 -0.186 (0.061) -0.037 (0.072) -0.153 (0.093) -0.0217 (0.0113)* 0.019 -0.153 (0.060) -0.083 (0.019)***
18. Smolensk Obl. 1998:09 0.000 -0.534 (0.101) -0.090 (0.036)** -0.133 (0.032)*** -0.0091 (0.0037)** 0.000 -0.395 (0.091) -0.182 (0.018)***
19. Tver Obl. 1998:09 0.000 -0.438 (0.088) -0.019 (0.010)* -0.072 (0.014)*** 0.0075 (0.0048) 0.000 -0.344 (0.082) -0.118 (0.013)***
20. Tula Obl. 1998:09 0.009 -0.299 (0.072) -0.145 (0.053)*** -0.082 (0.044)* -0.0161 (0.0046)*** 0.308 -0.042 (0.033) -0.050 (0.031)
21. Yaroslavl Obl. 1998:09 0.005 -0.396 (0.089) -0.013 (0.021) -0.084 (0.026)*** -0.0087 (0.0066) 0.000 -0.388 (0.088) -0.077 (0.009)***
22. Rep. of Mariy El 1999:02 0.050 -0.267 (0.076) -0.129 (0.025)*** -0.048 (0.014)*** 0.0038 (0.0027) 0.486 -0.016 (0.018) -0.045 (0.031)
23. Rep. of Mordovia 1998:09 0.055 -0.262 (0.079) -0.303 (0.077)*** 0.108 (0.056)* -0.0049 (0.0039) 0.282 -0.015 (0.014) 0.125 (0.039)***
24. Chuvash Rep. 1998:10 0.018 -0.301 (0.081) -0.163 (0.025)*** -0.052 (0.016)*** -0.0015 (0.0022) 0.661 -0.012 (0.018) -0.070 (0.027)**
25. Kirov Obl. 1998:09 0.036 -0.273 (0.076) -0.050 (0.016)*** -0.052 (0.010)*** 0.0114 (0.0043)** 0.386 -0.050 (0.040) -0.125 (0.030)***
26. Nizhni Novgorod
      Obl. 1998:11 0.004 -0.441 (0.093) -0.033 (0.011)*** -0.037 (0.007)*** 0.0124 (0.0042)*** 0.085 -0.129 (0.057) -0.099 (0.024)***
27. Belgorod Obl. 1998:09 0.001 -0.463 (0.095) -0.314 (0.101)*** 0.046 (0.081) -0.0137 (0.0044)*** 0.393 -0.040 (0.029) 0.056 (0.064)
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Model (4*) Model (6*)
Region
Break
period p(λ=0) λ γ Break (γB) δ p(λ=0) λ Break (γB)
28. Voronezh Obl. 1998:08 0.000 -0.524 (0.098) -0.646 (0.142)*** 0.249 (0.129)* -0.0288 (0.0029)*** 0.069 -0.036 (0.020) 0.042 (0.045)
29. Kursk Obl. 1998:09 0.001 -0.490 (0.099) -0.412 (0.130)*** 0.148 (0.112) -0.0202 (0.0045)*** 0.121 -0.044 (0.025) 0.079 (0.053)
30. Lipetsk Obl. 1998:09 0.002 -0.468 (0.095) -0.391 (0.071)*** 0.134 (0.059)** -0.0148 (0.0026)*** 0.226 -0.019 (0.016) 0.084 (0.036)**
31. Tambov Obl. 1998:10 0.004 -0.362 (0.082) -0.176 (0.046)*** -0.068 (0.033)** -0.0074 (0.0034)** 0.362 -0.038 (0.031) -0.059 (0.044)
32. Rep. of Kalmykia 1998:10 0.000 -0.548 (0.103) -0.045 (0.038) -0.117 (0.037)*** -0.0115 (0.0054)** 0.000 -0.401 (0.091) -0.127 (0.016)***
33. Rep. of Tatarstan 1998:09 0.000 -0.614 (0.101) -0.363 (0.058)*** 0.077 (0.045)* -0.0077 (0.0022)*** 0.162 -0.030 (0.020) 0.100 (0.061)
34. Astrakhan Obl. 1998:12 0.000 -0.699 (0.107) -0.131 (0.079) -0.047 (0.072) -0.0235 (0.0054)*** 0.000 -0.390 (0.089) -0.098 (0.017)***
35. Volgograd Obl. 1998:12 0.001 -0.483 (0.094) -0.040 (0.020)** -0.051 (0.015)*** 0.0021 (0.0057) 0.000 -0.354 (0.084) -0.099 (0.015)***
36. Penza Obl. 1998:09 0.060 -0.247 (0.075) -0.349 (0.100)*** 0.101 (0.076) -0.0146 (0.0046)*** 0.275 -0.020 (0.015) 0.073 (0.033)**
37. Samara Obl. 1998:12 0.001 -0.469 (0.095) 1.625 (4.531) -1.661 (4.548) -0.0475 (0.0422) 0.000 -0.372 (0.088) -0.022 (0.017)
38. Saratov Obl. 1998:09 0.079 -0.228 (0.071) -0.774 (0.503) 0.526 (0.451) -0.0285 (0.0112)** 0.255 -0.027 (0.020) 0.144 (0.046)***
39. Ulyanovsk Obl. 1998:09 0.000 -0.577 (0.098) -0.600 (0.068)*** 0.152 (0.057)*** -0.0133 (0.0016)*** 0.036 -0.032 (0.016) 0.044 (0.058)
40. Rep. of Adygeya 1998:09 0.000 -0.772 (0.108) -0.366 (0.068)*** 0.118 (0.059)** -0.0178 (0.0025)*** 0.302 -0.035 (0.025) 0.084 (0.053)
41. Rep. of Dagestan 1999:02 0.000 -0.582 (0.102) -0.074 (0.045) -0.039 (0.035) -0.0084 (0.0066) 0.000 -0.481 (0.096) -0.090 (0.014)***
42. Kabardian-Balkar
      Rep. 1998:08 0.000 -0.232 (0.040) 5.224 (9.665) -6.051 (9.679) -0.0932 (0.0166)*** 0.066 -0.108 (0.052) -0.064 (0.044)
43. Karachaev-
      Cirkassian Rep. 1998:09 0.005 -0.392 (0.090) -0.399 (0.205)* 0.229 (0.180) -0.0183 (0.0078)** 0.428 -0.043 (0.032) 0.084 (0.053)
44. Rep. of Northern
      Ossetia 1998:09 0.002 -0.444 (0.094) -0.391 (0.198)* 0.138 (0.177) -0.0284 (0.0068)*** 0.229 -0.064 (0.037) 0.033 (0.051)
45. Krasnodar Krai 1998:09 0.000 -0.619 (0.105) -0.430 (0.157)*** 0.234 (0.140)* -0.0199 (0.0053)*** 0.251 -0.092 (0.049) 0.014 (0.058)
46. Stavropol Krai 1998:09 0.000 -0.568 (0.101) -0.273 (0.076)*** 0.091 (0.063) -0.0146 (0.0039)*** 0.315 -0.035 (0.027) 0.070 (0.044)
47. Rostov Obl. 1998:09 0.000 -0.692 (0.108) -0.219 (0.041)*** 0.027 (0.032) -0.0085 (0.0026)*** 0.309 -0.047 (0.031) 0.014 (0.048)
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Model (4*) Model (6*)
Region
Break
period p(λ=0) λ γ Break (γB) δ p(λ=0) λ Break (γB)
48. Rep. of
      Bashkortostan 1998:12 0.005 -0.397 (0.090) -0.058 (0.026)** -0.054 (0.018)*** 0.0037 (0.0057) 0.006 -0.240 (0.073) -0.126 (0.024)***
49. Udmurt Rep. 1998:11 0.005 -0.378 (0.089) -0.034 (0.013)** -0.058 (0.012)*** 0.0086 (0.0047)* 0.017 -0.185 (0.064) -0.129 (0.022)***
50. Kurgan Obl. 1998:11 0.002 -0.335 (0.071) -0.017 (0.011) -0.019 (0.007)*** 0.0250 (0.0085)*** 0.007 -0.131 (0.042) -0.099 (0.031)***
51. Orenburg Obl. 1998:10 0.006 -0.390 (0.089) -0.008 (0.007) -0.021 (0.010)** 0.0334 (0.0112)*** 0.020 -0.167 (0.060) -0.110 (0.040)***
52. Perm Obl. 1999:02 0.000 -0.515 (0.091) -1.971 (2.709) 2.086 (2.733) -0.0625 (0.0202)*** 0.005 -0.240 (0.072) 0.019 (0.013)
53. Sverdlovsk Obl. 1999:01 0.017 -0.376 (0.088) 0.937 (0.855) -0.782 (0.824) -0.0401 (0.0137)*** 0.265 -0.060 (0.039) -0.043 (0.033)
54. Chelyabinsk Obl. 1998:08 0.000 -0.811 (0.109) 0.000 (0.000) -0.002 (0.004) 0.0602 (0.0411) 0.000 -0.722 (0.105) -0.014 (0.009)
55. Rep. of Altai 1998:09 0.006 -0.476 (0.095) -17.318 (59.734) 17.279 (59.717) -0.0906 (0.0581) 0.000 -0.394 (0.088) 0.008 (0.017)
56. Altai Krai 1998:09 0.019 -0.287 (0.076) -0.341 (0.152)** 0.200 (0.129) -0.0132 (0.0070)* 0.506 -0.023 (0.024) 0.077 (0.039)*
57. Kemerovo Obl. 1999:01 0.002 -0.397 (0.081) -0.116 (0.165) 0.179 (0.193) -0.0160 (0.0191) 0.000 -0.310 (0.069) 0.038 (0.015)**
58. Novosibirsk Obl. 1999:01 0.002 -0.359 (0.073) 0.003 (0.004) 0.007 (0.007) 0.0337 (0.0208) 0.000 -0.306 (0.070) 0.033 (0.013)**
59. Omsk Obl. 1999:01 0.000 -0.578 (0.101) -0.910 (0.296)*** 0.667 (0.282)** -0.0340 (0.0045)*** 0.171 -0.036 (0.024) 0.082 (0.040)**
60. Tomsk Obl. 1998:09 0.000 -0.545 (0.096) -0.011 (0.015) 0.017 (0.020) 0.0269 (0.0194) 0.003 -0.256 (0.072) 0.010 (0.021)
61. Tyumen Obl. 1998:09 0.255 -0.149 (0.059) -0.368 (1.121) 0.628 (1.319) -0.0452 (0.0370) 0.033 -0.138 (0.056) 0.068 (0.024)***
62. Rep. of Buryatia 1998:09 0.050 -0.249 (0.076) 0.011 (0.047) 0.163 (0.080)** -0.0093 (0.0110) 0.005 -0.232 (0.073) 0.118 (0.022)***
63. Rep. of Tuva 1998:09 0.007 -0.380 (0.090) 0.113 (0.037)*** 0.105 (0.024)*** 0.0022 (0.0044) 0.331 -0.073 (0.046) 0.118 (0.044)***
64. Rep. of Khakasia 1999:01 0.013 -0.329 (0.081) 0.007 (0.008) 0.007 (0.005) 0.0298 (0.0171)* 0.017 -0.200 (0.068) 0.038 (0.018)**
65. Krasnoyarsk Krai 1998:09 0.063 -0.238 (0.071) 0.000 (0.004) 0.026 (0.032) 0.0279 (0.0252) 0.014 -0.196 (0.066) 0.070 (0.026)***
66. Irkutsk Obl. 1999:02 0.011 -0.347 (0.086) 0.049 (0.052) 0.125 (0.059)** -0.0020 (0.0099) 0.001 -0.342 (0.085) 0.147 (0.026)***
67. Chita Obl. 1998:09 0.001 -0.450 (0.091) 0.298 (0.076)*** 0.106 (0.054)* -0.0115 (0.0034)*** 0.430 -0.046 (0.035) 0.111 (0.048)**
68. Rep. of Sakha
      (Yakutia) 1998:11 0.074 -0.248 (0.073) 0.830 (0.208)*** 0.298 (0.116)** -0.0034 (0.0037) 0.679 -0.007 (0.014) 0.080 (0.075)
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Model (4*) Model (6*)
Region
Break
period p(λ=0) λ γ Break (γB) δ p(λ=0) λ Break (γB)
69. Jewish Autonomous
      Obl. 1999:02 0.003 -0.422 (0.091) 0.183 (0.045)*** 0.148 (0.035)*** -0.0097 (0.0028)*** 0.134 -0.035 (0.021) 0.024 (0.035)
70. Primorsky Krai 1998:09 0.229 -0.189 (0.072) 0.818 (0.228)*** -0.218 (0.153) -0.0121 (0.0045)*** 0.363 -0.011 (0.011) -0.120 (0.043)***
71. Khabarovsk Krai 1998:12 0.000 -0.571 (0.104) 0.298 (0.048)*** 0.143 (0.034)*** -0.0073 (0.0020)*** 0.409 -0.025 (0.022) 0.068 (0.046)
72. Amur Obl. 1999:01 0.010 -0.305 (0.074) 0.093 (0.046)** 0.144  (0.043)*** -0.0026 (0.0060) 0.006 -0.216 (0.063) 0.170 (0.028)***
73. Kamchatka Obl. 1998:12 0.004 -0.428 (0.092) 0.569 (0.083)*** 0.569 (0.083)*** 0.0017 (0.0020) 0.790 -0.005 (0.014) 0.179 (0.063)***
74. Magadan Obl. 1998:12 0.326 -0.113 (0.053) 0.853 (0.243)*** 0.333 (0.111)*** -0.0032 (0.0048) 0.478 -0.008 (0.010) 0.155 (0.051)***
75. Sakhalin Obl. 1998:12 0.174 -0.177 (0.065) 0.725 (0.187)*** 0.293 (0.108)*** -0.0079 (0.0042)* 0.535 -0.010 (0.014) 0.137 (0.055)**
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C. Granger causality test results for different number of lags
Table C1. Summary statistics
Nr->, number
of regions
Nr<-, number
of regions
Nr<->, number
of regions
Nr, number
of regions
Statistic
3 lags 6 lags 12 lags 3 lags 6 lags 12 lags 3 lags 6 lags 12 lags 3 lags 6 lags 12 lags
Minimum 10 8 7 7 7 5 1 1 0 22 26 12
Maximum 49 47 45 55 58 54 21 32 27 61 65 61
Average 27 29 22 27 29 22 10 12 7 44 46 38
Correlation with 3-lag
results – 0.79 0.48 – 0.71 0.23 – 0.68 0.36 – 0.82 0.52
Correlation with 6-lag
results 0.79 – 0.60 0.71 – 0.49 0.68 – 0.61 0.82 – 0.64
Correlation with 12-lag
results 0.48 0.60 – 0.23 0.49 – 0.36 0.61 – 0.52 0.64 –
                                                 (a) Nr->                                                                                  (b) Nr<-
                                                   (c) N r<->                                                                                  (d) Nr
Fig. C1. Histograms of results obtained with different number of lags
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D. Non-parametric estimates of price distributions
(a) Yearly distributions
(b) Instantaneous distributions
Fig. D1. All regions
(a) Yearly distributions
(b) Instantaneous distributions
Fig. D2. Non-integrated regions
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(a) Yearly distributions
(b) Instantaneous distributions
Fig. D3. Regions tending to integration
(a) Yearly distributions
(b) Instantaneous distributions
Fig. D4. Integrated regions
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E. Price inequality and mobility measures
Fig. E1. The Gini coefficient vs. the standard deviation of log prices
Fig. E2. Relative vs. absolute price mobility
Gt/Gt – 1
Γt,t – 1
β*t – 1,t
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 56
REFERENCES
ACCRA (1994-2002). ACCRA Cost of Living Index. Vol. 27 through 35.
Barro, R. J. and X. Sala-i-Martin (1992). Convergence. Journal of Political Economy, 10 (2), 223-251.
Beenstock, M. (2003). Rank and Quantity Mobility in the Empirical Dynamics of Inequality. Hebrew University.
(Unpublished manuscript).
Berkowitz, D., D. N. DeJong and S. Husted (1998). Quantifying Russia’s Price Liberalization. Journal of Comparative
Economics, 26, 735-760.
Berkowitz, D. and D. N. DeJong (1999). Russia’s Internal Border. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 29, 633-
649.
Berkowitz, D. and D. N. DeJong (2001). The Evolution of Market Integration in Russia. Economics of Transition, 9 (1),
87-104.
Berkowitz, D. and D. N. DeJong (2003). Regional Integration: An Empirical Assessment of Russia. Journal of Urban
Economics, 53, 541–559.
Conway, P. (1999). Privatization and Price Convergence: Evidence from Four Markets in Kiev. Journal of Comparative
Economics, 27, 231–257.
Cushman, D. O., R. MacDonald and M. Samborsky (2001). The Law of One Price for Transitional Ukraine. Economics
Letters, 73, 251–256.
Durlauf, S. N. and D. Quah (1999). The New Empirics of Economic Growth. In: Taylor, J. and M. Woodford, eds.,
Handbook of Macroeconomics, Vol. 1, 235–308.
Engel, C. and J. H. Rogers (1996). How Wide Is the Border? American Economic Review, 87, 354-358.
Fields, G.S. and E.A. Ok (2001). The Measurement of Income Mobility: An Introduction to the Literature. In: J.Silber
(ed.), Handbook on Income Inequality Measurement, Boston, Kluwer Academic Press, 557-596.
Gardner, B. and K.N. Brooks (1994). Food Prices and Market Integration in Russia: 1992-1994. American Journal of
Agricultural Economics, 76, 641-666.
Gluschenko, K. (2001a). Interregional Variability of Inflation Rates. EERC Working Paper No. 99/17.
Gluschenko, K. (2001b). Consumer Prices in Russia in 1992-2000: Spatial Dimension. Region: Economics and
Sociology, No. 2, 46-71 [Глущенко К. П. Потребительские цены в России в 1992-2000 гг.: пространственный
аспект. Регион: экономика и социология, 2001, № 2].
Gluschenko, K. (2001c). Price Indices in the Western-Siberian Regions. Bulletin of the Novosibirsk State University.
Economic and Social Sciences Series, 1 (2), 5-20 [Глущенко К. П. Индексы цен в западносибирских регионах.
Вестник Новосибирского государственного университета. Серия: социально-экономические науки. Т. 1, вып. 2.].
Gluschenko, K. (2002a). Common Russian Market: Myth rather than Reality. EERC Working Paper No. 01/11.
Gluschenko, K. (2002b). Econometric Analysis of the Degree of Integration of the National Market. Region: Economics
and Sociology, No. 3, 67-86 [Глущенко К. П. Эконометрический анализ интегрированности российского
внутреннего рынка. Регион: экономика и социология, 2002, № 3].
Gluschenko, K. (2003). Market Integration in Russia During the Transformation Years. Economics of Transition, 11
(3), 411-434.
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 57
Goskomstat of Russia (1996). Methodological Regulations on Statistics, Issue 1, Moscow.
Goskomstat of Russia (2000-2003). Socioeconomic Situation of Russia. 2000: No. 6 through 12; 2001: No. 1 through 12;
2002: No. 1 through 12; 2003: No. 1 through 11.
Goodwin, B.K., T.J. Grennes and C. McCurdy (1999). Spatial Price Dynamics and Integration in Russian Food
Markets. Policy Reform, 3, 157-193.
Jarvis, S. and S. P. Jenkins (1998). How Much Income Mobility Is There in Britain? Economic Journal, 108, No. 447,
428-443.
MacKinnon, J. G. (1996). Numerical Distribution Functions for Unit Root and Cointegration Tests. Journal of Applied
Econometrics, 11, 601-618.
Newey, W. and K. West (1994). Automatic Lag Selection in Covariance Matrix Estimation. Review of Economic
Studies, 61, 631-653.
Olkin, I. And S. Yitzhaki (1992). Gini Regression Analysis. International Statistical Review, 60, 185-196.
Parsley, D. C. and S.-J. Wei (1996). Convergence to the Law of One Price without Trade Barriers or Currency
Fluctuations. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111 (4), 1211-1236.
Perron, P. and T. Vogelsang (1992). Nonstationarity and Level Shifts with an Application to Purchasing Power Parity.
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 10, 301-320.
Quah, D. (1996). Convergence Empirics across Economies with (Some) Capital Mobility. Journal of Economic Growth,
1 (1), 95-124.
Rey, S.J. and B. D. Montouri (1999). U.S. Regional Income Convergence: A Spatial Econometric Perspective. Regional
Studies, 33, 143-156.
Rogers, J. H. (2002). Monetary Union, Price Level Convergence, and Inflation: How Close Is Europe to the United
States? Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve System, October 2002.  (Unpublished manuscript)
Rogoff, K. (1996). The Purchasing Power Parity Puzzle. Journal of Economic Literature, 34 (2), 647-668.
Sala-i-Martin, X. (1996). The Classical Approach to Convergence Analysis. Economic Journal, 106, 1019-1036.
Sarno, L. and M. P. Taylor (2002). Purchasing Power Parity and the Real Exchange Rate. IMF Staff Papers, 49, 65-105.
Shleifer, A. and D. Treisman (2003). A Normal Country. NBER Working Paper No. 10057.
Silverman, B. W. (1986). Density Estimation for Statistics and Data Analysis. Chapman and Hall, London.
Singer, B. and S. Spilerman (1976). Some Methodological Issues in the Analysis of Longitudinal Surveys. Annals of
Economic and Social Measurement, 5, 447-474.
Wodon, Q. and S. Yitzhaki (2001). Growth and Convergence: An Alternative Empirical Framework. World Bank and
Hebrew University. (Unpublished manuscript).
Yitzhaki, S. and Q. Wodon (2001). Mobility, Inequality, and Horizontal Mobility. World Bank and Hebrew University.
(Unpublished manuscript).
